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THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING FOUNDERS
PAUL R. TREMBLAY
ABSTRACT
Lawyers assisting entrepreneurial startups frequently work with
individual founders before any formal organizational client materializes. In advising founders about such legal matters as whether
to establish an entity, and if so, which entity best fits the needs of
the enterprise, as well as how to arrange the owners’ relationships
within the business, the lawyer necessarily has an attorney-client
relationship with someone. The prevailing scholarship about startup
representation pays surprisingly little attention to the posture of
the lawyer and her founder-clients in the pre-organization context.
This Article investigates the lawyer’s responsibilities and commitments in depth.
A lawyer working with a solo founder faces few inherent ethical
challenges in that role. By contrast, a lawyer assisting multiple
founders—likely the most common startup arrangement—encounters critical ethical choices. She may represent each of the founders
individually and jointly, or she may represent the collectivity as a
de facto partnership. That mutually exclusive distinction driven, the
Article argues, by the nature of the startup’s business activity, affects
the lawyer’s responsibilities and the founders’ duties to one another.
The founders’ counsel also must account for the fact that the startup
world in practice can be quite fluid, with a team of founders shifting over time, as some participants drift away and are replaced by
new team members. The departing founders will then qualify either as former clients or as former partners, and in either instance
the lawyer must be transparent about her duties to the remaining
founders. Finally, in those settings where the founders intend to
Clinical Professor of Law and Law School Fund Distinguished Scholar, Boston
College Law School. I thank Mary Ann Chirba, Charlene Luke, Judy McMorrow,
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establish a charitable organization—one that will not have owners—
the lawyer’s duties to the founders are further complicated.
This Article examines the ethical responsibilities of the founders’
lawyer in each of those contexts in light of the best reading of available substantive law teachings.
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INTRODUCTION
Most new businesses are founded by individuals.1 Those individuals, if the business continues beyond the conception stage,
most often will establish some entity, such as a corporation or an
LLC, through which to operate the enterprise.2 And, quite frequently
the entity choice and creation take place with the assistance of
counsel.3 When a lawyer assists the individuals to establish an entity and to address other startup-related legal matters, the lawyer
represents someone—perhaps the individuals, perhaps an inchoate group, or perhaps an actual partnership. This Article explores
and articulates the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the
founders of such businesses prior to the emergence of a separate,
cognizable organization.
If the founder of the new business is a solo individual (or an organization), the representational strategies are straightforward and
need no guidance here.4 If the founders are multiple individuals,
the representational strategies are hardly straightforward, and this
Article will attempt to clarify their components. This topic has received insufficient attention in the legal ethics and entrepreneurship
literature up to now, notwithstanding the substantial attention
paid to the role of the lawyer representing organizations,5 including
WHO STARTED NEW BUSINESSES IN 2013?, KAUFFMAN FOUND. & LEGALZOOM,
at 1–5 (Jan. 2014), http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/Kauffman_org/research
%20reports%20and%20covers/2014/01/who_started_new_business_in_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8YT-QGWT] (treating founders as individuals by polling about
age, gender, and levels of education). In 2015, 679,072 businesses in the United
States were less than one year old. Entrepreneurship and the U.S. Economy,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.bls.gov/bdm/entrepreneurship
/bdm_chart1.htm [https://perma.cc/SJ5E-YFFM].
2 See Ann MacDonald, Is It Time to Convert Your Sole Proprietorship to a
Corporation or LLC?, LEGAL ZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/is-it
-time-to-convert-your-sole-proprietorship-to-a-corporation-or-llc [https://perma
.cc/ZTZ3-UDTS] (stating that business owners incorporate only after knowing
the business is viable).
3 See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to
Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 773–75 (2004) (stating
that counsel assists entrepreneurs to clear legal hurdles such as entity choice).
4 For a discussion of the types of issues that counsel for an entrepreneur ought
to address, see generally Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts,
50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 163 (2014); Mann et al., supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations When Representing Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 581 (2003) [hereinafter Burman, Ethical Considerations];
James M. Fischer, Representing Partnerships: Who Is/Are the Client(s)?, 26 PAC.
1
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small organizations and startups.6 The lawyer’s role in working
with multiple founders is complicated by three considerations, each
of which serves as a central theme of this Article. First, even if the
advice to the lawyer is that prudence and best practices would urge
her to develop a transparent and comprehensive engagement agreement identifying the client(s) and reviewing all of the critical complications that the representation is likely to entail, that advice
must be preceded by a well-grounded understanding of the default principles around which the engagement agreement will be
crafted. Second, and as a significant example of the first theme, some
instances of multiple founder representation will involve a collection of individuals, while other instances will involve a partnership
by operation of law, whether the founders know it or desire it.7 The
lawyer’s responsibilities will differ depending on which context
applies, and therefore the lawyer must be able to reliably recognize
when partnership principles apply and when they do not.
Finally, virtually none of the commentary addresses the lawyer’s
duties amid the reality of what I will call “founder drift.”8 In many
L.J. 961 (1995); Burnet Maybank III & Cathy Black, Ethical Considerations
for Transactional Lawyers, S.C. LAW., July/Aug. 1994, at 37; Lawrence E.
Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466 (1989); D. Ryan Nayar, Almost Clients: A
Closer Look at Attorney Responsibility in the Context of Entity Representation,
41 TEX. J. BUS. L. 313 (2006); Thomas E. Rutledge, When Your Client Is an
Organization—Some of the Problems Not Resolved by Rule 1.13, 40 N. KY. L. REV.
357 (2013); William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer
Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2003); Note,
An Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1993).
6 See generally Edna Selan Epstein, Who Is the Client in the Closely Held
Corporation?, 40 LITIG. 8 (2013); Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of Client Identity in the Context of Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV.
181 (2004); Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in
Representing Limited Liability Companies and Other Unincorporated Associations and Their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV. 389 (1995); Bryan J.
Pechersky, Note, Representing General Partnerships and Close Corporations:
A Situational Analysis of Professional Responsibility, 73 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1995);
John M. Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, Part III Special Considerations When Representing a New Organization, WYO. LAW., Dec. 2012, at 46
[hereinafter Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship].
7 See Richard A. Booth, Partnership Law and the Single Entity Defense, 18
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 4 (2012) (“There is no need for a written agreement.
Partnership happens.”). See infra notes 169–80 and accompanying text.
8 See John C. Ale & Buck McKinney, Stumbling into Partnerships: How Bands,
Business Owners and Strategic Allies Find Themselves in Inadvertent Partnerships,
43 TEX. J. BUS. L. 465 (2009); Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weidner, Partners
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settings, and especially so in high-tech enterprises with little capital
investment required, the collectivity of founders will manifest as
a shifting array, with some “helpers” present when the lawyer first
encounters the business—only to drift away later, and often be replaced by new helpers. Closely connected to the drift phenomenon is
the lawyer’s responsibility to discern who among the array of helpers qualifies as a “founder,” assuming, as is likely, that capacity matters to the legal engagement questions and the resulting duties of
the lawyer.
The questions just described apply to the lawyer’s work with
for-profit enterprises owned by some founders, but they apply as
well, if in a quite different fashion, to nonprofit social enterprises
whose founders have no ownership rights. This Article will explore both of those contexts. The lawyer’s responsibilities may
also differ, or at least her strategic considerations will vary, depending on whether the lawyer charges fees for the legal work
provided, or whether she represents the founders on a pro bono
basis. The discussion here will address that factor as well.
Part I briefly examines why these issues matter, given that most
practitioners will define the relationship with founder-clients
through an engagement letter or retainer agreement articulating
the client’s identity and the lawyer’s expectations.9 As we shall see,
understanding the substantive duties that exist outside of such
an agreement is critical not just for those (presumably few) lawyers who will engage in representation without a clear writing, but
for all such lawyers, as the permissible permutations of the representational contours will depend on the lawyer’s appreciation
of the available choices.10 The Article then begins its substantive
discussion with for-profit enterprises in the private practice context, with the lawyer expecting to be paid for the representation.
In the for-profit world, much turns on whether the collectivity
qualifies as a partnership.11 Part II begins with “inchoate” enterprises, which this Article argues do not constitute partnerships. If the
lawyer represents a collection of founders who are not partners,
Without Partners: The Legal Status of Single Person Partnerships, 17 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 449 (2012).
9 See Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, supra note 6, at 47;
see also Fischer, supra note 5, at 962.
10 See Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, supra note 6, at 47.
11 See Fischer, supra note 5, at 961.
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she necessarily represents the individuals,12 and Part II addresses
her duties in that joint representation context, along with her choice
to represent just one of the founders. Part II includes how those ordinary joint representation dynamics are affected by the founder
drift phenomenon, as well as the challenge of identifying which of
the initial (or later) collective ought to serve as the lawyer’s joint
clients. Part III then addresses “active” for-profit businesses, which
most will agree are in fact partnerships by operation of law.13 In
this setting, the lawyer most likely represents the partnership as
an entity and not the individual founders,14 although Part III examines whether that is a legal truism or whether the parties have a
choice to proceed in a different fashion. Once again, this discussion must account for the coming and going of founders who might
qualify as partners.
Part IV turns to the context of nonprofit or charitable organizations. Perhaps unfortunately for the lawyer’s understanding of
her duties as well as for the analytical simplicity of this Part, the
distinction at the founder stage between “for-profit” and “nonprofit”
enterprises will sometimes not be clear, as the founders may have
a choice about how to structure a particular business.15 But for those
enterprises that will eventually be established as charitable and/or
tax-exempt organizations, which cannot include an ownership element, the lawyer’s responsibilities to the founders are, as Part IV
shows, even less clear than within the for-profit world. Founders
of charitable or community organizations have lessened rights to determine the mission and strategic visions of the organization. The
client base in those settings is likely to be more fluid and more ambiguous than in an enterprise owned by some identifiable persons.16
Finally, lawyers offering guidance to nonprofit entities will operate
amid what might be termed a “thicker theory of the good,”17 a quality absent from the private enterprise universe and therefore altering some of the lawyer’s representational responsibilities.
See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 589.
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 101 (2004);
Booth, supra note 7, at 4.
14 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 115–16.
15 See Paul R. Tremblay, Counseling Community Groups, 17 CLINICAL L.
REV. 389, 390 (2010).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 389 (stating that nonprofit lawyers represent “the dispossessed, the
exploited, and the powerless”).
12
13
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I. DEFAULT UNDERSTANDINGS OF FOUNDER REPRESENTATION
A “best practices” standard of prudent transactional lawyering
will recommend that a lawyer representing startup founders establish the contours of his representation through a written retainer
agreement or engagement letter.18 In some jurisdictions, a written agreement is required, at least when the lawyer charges a
fee.19 In light of that reality, it is fair to inquire why lawyers need
to understand the default nature of the attorney-client relationship where no such agreement is in place. Of course, sometimes,
whether consistent with the applicable ethics rules or not, lawyers will proceed to work with founders without such a clear articulation, and those lawyers will benefit (if perhaps in hindsight,
after something went amiss) in understanding what the default
arrangements seem to be.20 But a moment’s reflection illustrates
why all lawyers working with startup founders need to appreciate
the permissible possibilities of the agreement.
A lawyer offering to represent a group of founders must, at the
time the retainer has been negotiated or determined (but not before
then), elect whether to identify the “client” (either the individuals
or an entity) as either a partnership or, perhaps, a prospective
formal organization such as a corporation.21 The lawyer might also
choose to offer joint representation to both the individuals and the
entity.22 The lawyer’s judgment and his negotiation with the individual founders will guide that decision. However, in order to craft
such an engagement agreement, the lawyer must understand the
available choices, and it is not clear that every choice will be available in every setting. The default substantive doctrine will limit
some choices or perhaps require some.
Unsurprisingly, many observers note the importance of a written client
agreement. See, e.g., STEPHEN F. REED & ESTHER S. BARRON, ENTREPRENEURSHIP LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 89 (2013); see also Fischer, supra note 5, at 962.
19 The Model Rules recommend, but do not require, a written fee agreement.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (2013). Some states, however,
require that fee agreements be in writing, subject to some minor exceptions.
See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b)(1) (2016).
20 See Fischer, supra note 5, at 963 (noting that the default rules are useful
for those without agreements).
21 See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (discussing authorities allowing for retroactive entity client representation).
22 See Fischer, supra note 5, at 963 (noting that under an “aggregate theory”
a lawyer represents both individuals and entity).
18
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For instance, as the proceeding discussion will show, a critical
pivot point for the lawyer to navigate is whether the several founders
are already a partnership or not.23 It is not an answer to assert
that the lawyer should simply decide, along with his client, which
designation they prefer. If the participants are not partners, and
if the default substantive doctrine would not by operation of law
deem their enterprise as a partnership, the lawyer may not have
the authority to declare that he will treat the group as partners.24
With partnership comes many responsibilities and possibly unforeseen liabilities.25 If the lawyer’s designation of the group as a
partnership for purposes of the retainer agreement serves to establish a partnership that otherwise would not exist, that choice may
have profound consequences. Alternatively, if the lawyer’s designation of the group as a partnership has no such effect—if, in
other words, the absence of required partnership elements cannot
be overcome by the lawyer’s having chosen that designation in an
engagement letter, which seems likely26—then different complications ensue, as the lawyer’s client then has no actual existence.
Similarly, and conversely, if the default designation were to
deem the enterprise a partnership, but the lawyer’s engagement
letter opts instead for individual representation of the partners
(without, of course, a recognition that they are partners), that choice
seemingly may always be available. However, it leaves the enterprise itself (the partnership) without counsel, and any conflicts
arising from partnership duties and benefits will not have been
sorted out at this early stage of the representation.
One response might be to recommend that the lawyer ought to
use his legal skill to assist the founders in choosing the best available representational designation. That is possibly wise advice,
but, of course, the lawyer’s client or clients for purposes of that
version of the choice-of-entity counseling will be subject to the default considerations that this project will seek to articulate.
23 See

infra notes 169–80 and accompanying text.
See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 596.
25 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 125–33.
26 In order for a partnership by default to come into existence, the venture
must include the necessary elements. The absence of the elements will not overcome an agreement among the participants to consider their arrangement a partnership. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Indus. Indem. Co., 688 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Mont.
1984) (noting “what the parties call their arrangement or intend their arrangement to be is irrelevant” if the elements determine a different result).
24
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One final consideration warrants a mention here. Even with a
clear engagement agreement, the phenomenon of founder drift, if
and when it occurs, will prompt some adjustments to the relationship between the lawyer and the remaining founders, and the default understandings will matter there as well.
For these reasons, this Article proceeds as though the lawyer
has no express agreement resolving the issues explored here. As
the analysis addresses differing permutations, keep in mind that
most lawyers will have better clarity in practice because of the terms
of the agreement chosen with any particular group of founders.
But, the default arrangements will continue to influence the available choices and strategies.
II. INCHOATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
Not every group of entrepreneurs assembled to carry out a new
business will qualify as a partnership.27 Some will, of course, but
many will not. In what can be termed “inchoate” businesses, no
entity exists to serve as the client until the founders have chosen and
then established some such entity. In that setting, the lawyer’s client
will be one or more of the founders.28 This Part examines the toggle point that triggers partnership status, and then proceeds to
identify the lawyer’s responsibilities when that toggle point has not
been reached, including how the lawyer in that universe responds
to founder drift. It then addresses those minority jurisdictions
that permit the lawyer to treat the collection of founders as a single group client notwithstanding the absence of a partnership.
A. When Does a Partnership Arise?
It is an elementary principle of business organizations doctrine
that a partnership arises by default, through an “association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit ...
whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”29 Four
elements must be present for a business to qualify as a partnership:
Small Business Encyclopedia: Partnership, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www
.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/partnership [https://perma.cc/2Q9T-S3ZU].
28 Merri A. Baldwin, Lawyers Representing Startups: Managing Ethical Obligations and Risks, CAL. BAR J. (Dec. 2013), http://apps.calbar.ca.gov/mcle-self
study/mcle_home.aspx?testID=80 [https://perma.cc/5JLA-6ZC8].
29 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997)
[hereinafter RUPA].
27
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(1) two or more persons; (2) associated; (3) to carry on a business
for profit; and (4) as co-owners.30 With those four elements in place, a
partnership exists, “whether or not the persons intend[ed] to form a
partnership.”31 A shared intention or plan among several founders
to establish a business, without any actual business activity or enterprise to control or to own, will not constitute a partnership.32
The available common law on when a partnership actually begins
to exist is remarkably opaque. Courts have held that no partnership
results when two or more persons actively plan to go into business
together, but the terms of the resulting business deal are too vague
to be identified or relied upon.33 At the same time, courts have also
held that the element of “carrying on a business for profit” can cover
plans for future business activity: “[I]t is not essential to the existence
of a partnership that business have actually been carried on. An
agreement to carry it on creates the partnership[.]”34 The critical
considerations appear to be shared ownership of the business with
accompanying management control, and sufficient clarity about the
terms of the enterprise and the substance of the products or services to be marketed, even if the business has not yet begun to
operate.35 Some beginning businesses will lack those qualities.36
Scores of reported cases have resolved disputes with a finding that
no partnership exists in settings with no formal entity in place, but
those cases typically involve questions of whether a participant ought
30 CHRISTINE HURT ET AL., BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.01
(2d ed. Supp. 2015).
31 RUPA § 202(a).
32 See, e.g., Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ. A. 1592-N, 2006 WL 905347, at *13
(Del. Ch. 2006) (finding when “[t]he relationship between [the participants] was still
inchoate,” no partnership existed); HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.04(c).
33 Ramone, 2006 WL 905347, at *13 (holding that agreeing to negotiate does
not create a partnership if there are no terms or agreed-upon relationship); Dreyfuss
v. Dreyfuss, 701 So. 2d 437, 438–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a father
and son did not have a partnership when terms such as payments and splitting
profits had not been discussed); Maloney v. Pihera, 573 N.E.2d 1379, 1388 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (“While the parties’ intended goal may have been to form a partnership, we agree with the trial court that no partnership was established.”).
34 Curley Elec., Inc. v. Bills, 121 P.3d 106, 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BLOOMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 59 (1968)).
35 See Ramone, 2006 WL 905347, at *13; see also RUPA § 202(a).
36 Some, although limited, commentary acknowledges that some founders
ought to be treated as individuals. See, e.g., Carl A. Pierce, Representing One
Client at a Time in Connection with the Formation and Organization of a Corporation, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 327, 347, 353 (2007).
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to be treated as an employee37 or a lender38 rather than a partner
of the other participant. Those cases are of little to no use to the
present inquiry, as they always involve ongoing business enterprises
with debts or profits worth wrangling over, and, in concluding that
no partnership exists, the courts find that the true owner is a sole
proprietor.39 That line of cases does serve as a useful reminder that
the lawyer working with what appears to be multiple founders does
need to attend to the possibility that only one of those founders is
the owner of the business, with the other participants deserving
of a status as something other than a founder or an owner.40
In light of the available doctrine, it appears likely that most
startups seeking legal advice will either qualify as partnerships
or as sole proprietorships that have employees. But, not every
startup will fit the requirements of Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (RUPA). Here is an example of a startup where the participants likely do not qualify as partners—a story we may use for
the discussion of the lawyer’s duties:
Janelle, Arjun, and Netia are all post-docs working at University
Hospital in its mental health department. Janelle has been puzzling through an idea for the past year or so for a software program,
or perhaps a mobile device app, that could assist social service
agencies to track opioid addicts and their outpatient care as
well as their interactions with the law enforcement community.
Janelle believes that this invention, if it can work, will be valuable to medical professionals around the country. She persuaded
Arjun and Netia to work with her to craft the mechanics, the
coding, and the possible marketing and business plan for this
invention. The trio also has been discussing with Sami, a former roommate of Netia who is an expert coder, the possibility
of his assisting on a part-time basis with the technical components of the software program.
Arjun has imagined a provisional name for the device—AddicTrak. The group has received some technical assistance and
37 See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 439, 441–42 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that the party was an employee, not a partner); BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 13, at 104–05.
38 See, e.g., TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir.
2006) (holding that the party was a lender, not a partner); BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 13, at 108–12.
39 See, e.g., Fenwick v. Unemp. Compensation Comm’n, 44 A.2d 172, 174–75
(N.J. 1945); Elizabeth R. Darby, Comment, Relations Between Attorneys: When
Does a Partnership Exist?, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 319, 322 (1993).
40 See HURT ET AL., supra note 30, at § 2.01 (citing examples).
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workspace from a local incubator, and has been promised informally a small amount of seed funding from what is known in the
entrepreneurship world as “the three Fs.” 41 Janelle and Netia
have each spent about $300 on software peripherals useful to
the work. The advisors at the startup incubator have urged the
group to seek some legal assistance earlier rather than later, and
so Janelle contacted Sofia Schendel, a partner in a three-member
law firm catering to small business transactional work. Sofia
meets with Janelle and Arjun (Netia could not attend the meeting
given her work schedule at the hospital) to discuss the possible
legal needs of this startup enterprise.

The collection of participants in the AddicTrak enterprise most
likely, at the time that Sofia meets with representatives of the
group, would not qualify as a partnership. Its business ideas are
manifestly “inchoate.” The app or computer program has not yet
been developed—it is, for now, simply a vision. There has been
virtually no capital investment, and there is nothing yet to own
collectively. Sofia, the lawyer, cannot in good faith treat the founders
as partners, at least not yet. She needs another representational
vehicle. That vehicle is, most likely, joint founder representation.
B. Joint Founder Representation
1. Whom Will the Law Firm Represent?
In the AddicTrak example, Sofia’s law firm would represent the
founders as joint clients, most often with an explicit understanding
that the firm would later represent any resulting business entity
formed as part of the representation.42 The only other plausible
alternative would be for the law firm to represent only one of the
founders.43 Since solo representation is presumably less risky than
multiple representation,44 that alternative cannot be dismissed outright, and at least one commentator has implied that this option
41 See

Martin Zwilling, 8 Best Practices to Seek Funding From Friends, Family and Fools, ENTREPRENEUR (May 22, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com
/article/246404 [https://perma.cc/CDJ7-3FXR].
42 See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 590, 593–98.
43 The remaining alternative—that the lawyer would represent two of the three
founders—seems implausible, and its implications would be effectively addressed
by the ethical analysis on the lawyer’s work for all three founders. See infra note 44.
44 Representing one client will on occasion trigger worries about conflicts of
interest, but representing multiple clients simultaneously always triggers that
worry. At least one observer sees those worries as significant enough to justify
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ought to be favored by founders’ lawyers.45 With single representation, the unrepresented founders either remain without counsel, or
choose, or perhaps are nudged, to retain their own lawyers.46
The attraction of choosing to represent one founder and not the
remaining founders arises from the fact that the lawyer for the
represented founder (let us assume this would mean Janelle) in the
inchoate setting does not owe duties to the other founders.47 If the
law imposed a duty on the law firm to treat all three founders equally
regardless of the arrangement, then this alternative would not be
worth considering at all. Absent the application of partnership principles and the accompanying fiduciary duties among the partners,
no source of authority imposes on the participants, and therefore
possibly on the lawyer,48 any fiduciary duties to one another in an
inchoate business setting.49
Nevertheless, representing just one of the three founders is likely
less common in practice than forming a relationship with all of
a ban on multiple representation. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Three’s a Crowd: A
Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 387, 458 (2001).
45 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 344–47.
46 Id. at 340.
47 The duties owed among the participants arises from partnership law. See
infra note 49. In some limited contexts, where the participants have operated
collectively in such a way as to invite reliance on the good faith of one another,
courts have imposed fiduciary-like duties even in the absence of a true partnership. See, e.g., Zaki Kulaibee Est. v. McFliker, 771 F.3d 1301, 1310–11, 1316
(11th Cir. 2014) (consignment relationship); see also Shain Inv. Co. v. Cohen,
443 N.E.2d 126, 130–31 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (joint venture missing one necessary element); Cusick v. Phillippi, 709 P.2d 1226, 1228, 1230 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985) (commission merchant); HURT ET AL., supra note 30, at 2–12.
48 This discussion assumes for the sake of argument that a lawyer representing
a fiduciary will be forbidden to assist that client in a breach of his fiduciary duty.
There is substantial authority asserting that it is not professional misconduct
for a lawyer to participate in that activity, but contrary authority does exist.
See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991);
Pierce, supra note 36, at 353–54. This topic receives more discussion in the next
section, where the business is not inchoate and therefore a partnership likely
exists as a matter of law. See infra Part III.
49 The source of authority for some duties among the participants is partnership law as well as the law of joint venture, which tracks partnership law.
See RICHARD D. HARROCH, 1 PARTNERSHIP & JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS
§ 2.09 (1992); George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic
Alliances, 57 BUS. LAW. 55, 55, 71, 104 (2001); Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J.
63, 64, 122 (1987).
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them—and for good reason. The choice to represent just one
founder means that the other founders either remain without counsel (the far more likely course) or retain their own counsel, with
the same joint-versus-individual choice point for a different law
firm.50 The latter is problematic in a number of ways,51 apart from
the obvious added expense. Two or more law firms looking after
their separate clients’ interests in a co-owned business invites fractiousness. It is not the way that most advisors recommend that a
collaborative, risk-sharing, soon-to-be jointly owned enterprise ought
to form.52
If the other founders do not get counsel, the potential for fractiousness is minimized, but not eliminated. Putting aside the fact
that the lawyer would need to find some system through which to
identify which founder receives the legal services,53 once that choice
has been made the lawyer ordinarily must put the interests of
that founder ahead of those of the unrepresented founders.54 Typically, the represented founder (Janelle) will desire to treat Arjun
and Netia with the utmost care and fairness. Arjun and Netia, however, will likely be uncertain either of the reliability of that sentiment, or whether Janelle’s counsel will nurture it.55 Put another
Pierce, supra note 36, at 340.
The prospect of separating collaborators in a new enterprise with little
initial investment into three discrete represented parties to negotiate and arrange their respective and collective interests is not very attractive, and it is
not likely to nurture the success of the relationship. For an insightful development of this concern in the family law context, see Rebecca Aviel, Counsel for
the Divorce, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1099, 1099, 1147 (2014).
52 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
682–83 (2d ed. 1994); Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 197 (implying that founders
need separate counsel from the company, but not stating that each founder
needs his or her own lawyer); Anne M. Tucker, Teaching LLCs by Design, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 525, 551 (2014). But see Alexander Muse, Founders, Your
Startup Lawyer Doesn’t Represent You, STARTUPMUSE (Jan. 9, 2016), http://start
upmuse.com/23617-2/ [https://perma.cc/6BDT-RZ9F] (implying that founders
need separate counsel from the company, but not stating that each founder
needs his or her own lawyer).
53 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 338–40.
54 See, e.g., id. at 342.
55 See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Robert Tuttle, Dependency and Delegation: The
Ethics of Marital Representation, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 101 n.13 (1998)
(discussing a similar arrangement with spouses and stating “[w]hile this model
may be economically efficient, it may result in a set of additional problems in
which the unrepresented spouse does not understand the lawyer’s role”).
50
51
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way, a promise by the lawyer to Arjun and Netia that their interests
will be respected deeply during the representation of Janelle is
not as powerful or effective as the lawyer’s explicit commitment
to represent the interests of all founders as joint clients.56
Because of its seeming prevalence among founders and their
lawyers, and because it most robustly nurtures the community of
interests within the emerging business,57 the proceeding discussion will accept the premise that the law firm will represent each
of the founders jointly and individually. The joint representation
of the three founders is presumptively proper, subject to the conditions explored below.58
2. Who Qualifies as a “Founder”?
To proceed with joint representation, the law firm needs to
identify who among the group of individuals working within the
inchoate business ought to be treated as a “founder,” and thereafter likely one of the joint clients.59 Especially for high-tech businesses that do not need significant infusions of capital in order to
generate the business model and a prototype of the platform or
application, the collectivity of founders may have a rather fluid
quality.60 A few buddies may work on the project for a while, but
56 Professor Pierce notes that Arjun and Netia would qualify as prospective
clients of the law firm, triggering some confidentiality and limited loyalty duties
on the part of the law firm to them. Pierce, supra note 36, at 338–40 (referencing
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18). That fact offers little comfort to the
unrepresented founders, as the law firm is unlikely to counsel the unrepresented individuals about those commitments.
57 See Aviel, supra note 51, at 1143 (explicating the importance of the shared
commitments when compared to individual interests); Patricia M. Batt, The
Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting
Elder Law Attorneys, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319, 337–41 (1992) (comparing
family members to organizational constituents whose shared interests supersede individual interests); Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to
“Non-Clients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity
Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV.
659, 687–95 (1994).
58 See generally Tremblay, supra note 15.
59 See Burman, Ethical Considerations, supra note 5, at 588–98 (discussing
the difficulties in identifying clients during the formation of new organizations).
60 See, e.g., Tremblay, supra note 15 (discussing the counseling of loosely
structured fluid groups); Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—
The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL
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if income generation is not quickly forthcoming they may return
to day jobs or other attractive endeavors with other technology
entrepreneurs. The fluidity issue is especially pronounced in pro
bono, inchoate contexts, since the availability of free legal services
means that anyone on the team could agree to be a founder/client
without any major commitment.61
The law firm, and especially a firm providing services on a pro
bono basis, needs to be intentional and prudent in identifying
which of the entrepreneurial “buddies” will become formal clients
of the firm. That decision belongs to the firm, which always has
the discretion about which clients it will choose to represent and
to whom it will offer its services.62 Those who receive an offer to
become clients of the firm most often will be the individuals who
the team expects will become equity holders or members of the
resulting organization—in other words, those who would by default be partners once the business has begun to operate.63 Employees, even those compensated with stock for their services, are
not partners, according to partnership doctrine.64 Representing
BUS. L. J. 265 (2006) (discussing equity compensation and the tendency of Silicon Valley employees to job hop).
61 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 343–44 (discussing the attorney-client relationship in the pro bono context).
62 It is fundamental that, except in inadvertent representation contexts or
court-appointments, a law firm may choose its clients. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6.03 n.4 (4th ed. 2014)
(“Although lawyers are entirely free to accept such a representation [of a client
who has engaged in criminal or illicit conduct], no individual lawyer is legally
required to accept any particular matter, except upon court appointment.”);
RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000) (discussing
consent as an essential component of an attorney-client relationship). A lawyer
may not discriminate in her choice of clients. See Nathanson v. Mass. Comm’n
Against Discrimination, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 2003) (discussing allegedly discriminatory practices by a female attorney who
refused to represent men in her legal practice). And, many argue that lawyers
have a moral (if not legal) obligation to represent those who cannot locate representation elsewhere. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, The Common Good and
the Duty to Represent: Must the Last Lawyer in Town Take Any Case?, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 137, 138, 154 (1999).
63 Recall that a partnership requires ownership and operations. See CRANE
AND BLOOMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 34, at 59; see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
64 Employees of an unincorporated business do not qualify as partners unless they also possess an ownership interest in the enterprise along with indicia of control. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 107; David B. Wilkins, Partner,
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only future partners and not future employees minimizes the potential conflicts of interest for the firm. Those assertions—that the
firm should offer its legal services to the future owners and not to the
future employees, and that the firm makes that determination—
are rather easy to state, but mask at least two complications that
the firm must confront in practice.
First, with technology startups especially, the participant founders may not be able easily or confidently to determine who qualifies
as a future owner and who ought to be seen as a future employee.
Indeed, since employees in technology startups are often compensated by stock options or their equivalent,65 the ownership criterion may not be sufficiently salient to serve the purpose the law firm
needs. Because in representing those individuals the firm must
minimize potential conflicts of interest, the choice of identified clients becomes a critical strategic judgment. The second complication follows from the first. The earlier analysis suggested that a firm
is typically better off representing founders as joint clients rather
than choosing one founder to serve as the client, with the expectation that the law firm would provide meaningful business-wide
legal assistance while having legal duties solely to that one
founder.66 The recognition that “founder” is a more slippery concept than one might desire reintroduces at least part of that worry.
A firm committing to represent the founders as joint clients often
will still have to identify some members of the startup team as
“non-founders”—that is to say employees, or perhaps consultants,
Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1264,
1268, 1271 (2007); Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(upholding trial court’s findings that the plaintiff was an employee, not a partner).
65 It is common that employees of cash-poor startup businesses work not for
wages, but for stock options and similar promises of equity in the business.
See, e.g., Booth, supra note 60, at 272 (“[I]t is perfectly easy to devise an option
plan or other system of equity compensation in a startup firm. Indeed, it is
quite common in small firms for an employee to work (in part) for an ownership
share.”); Meghan Casserly, Understanding Employee Equity: Every Startup’s
Secret Weapon, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/meghancasserly/2013/03/08/understanding-employee-equity-bill-harris-sxsw
/#62d657ff3e05 [https://perma.cc/P9QV-3WFK]. Whether that arrangement
satisfies the applicable minimum wage laws is a question beyond the scope of
this Article. For a discussion of that tension, see Adam Lang, A Hidden Danger
for Businesses in Nevada, 14 NEV. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2009).
66 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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and therefore not entitled to free representation.67 That process
itself will, at times, occur with some of the non-clients present, as
the lawyer investigates which participants best fit the “founder”
requirements. And, since investment may be small in many technology startups, that factor may not serve as the most reliable
proxy for ownership, as it would in other settings.68
In the end, the law firm will exercise its discretion about to
whom to offer joint representation in light of these considerations,
with special attention to the possible conflicts of interest should
the firm end up with a mix of founders and employees. In the example above, Sofia will likely offer joint representation to Janelle,
Arjun, and Netia; she is unlikely to offer representation to Sami,
who does not yet appear to qualify as a founder. Nothing prohibits
the firm from including Sami if the team requested that Sami also
be included, as long as the joint representation conflicts questions
are addressed expressly and adequately.69
3. Formation of the Joint Client Relationship:
Informed Consent
Every joint representation presents the potential for a conflict
of interest and invites a discussion of the special confidentiality
rules that apply in joint representation.
a. Consent to the Shared Representation
Model Rule 1.7 requires informed consent, “confirmed in writing,”
if a waivable70 conflict of interest arises.71 A conflict of interest
See Wilkins, supra note 64, at 1264, 1268, 1271.
inherent lack of clarity about which of the participants in a technology startup business qualify as “founders” has created complications for some
law firms in the past. See, e.g., Robbins v. Payne, 55 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App.
2001) (determining whether partnership existed and what fiduciary duties were
between two founders in starting an internet services corporation).
69 See generally Pierce, supra note 36; Wilkins, supra note 64.
70 This Article will refer to a client’s consent to a conflict of interest as a
“waiver,” even though that term may not represent accurately the process of
the lawyer’s proceeding notwithstanding the conflict, especially since waivers
in other contexts (but not here) may be implied. The “waiver” term is wellestablished. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108
YALE L.J. 407, 409 (1998).
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (2015).
67

68 The
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exists if “there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of one or more of the clients would be materially and adversely
affected by the lawyer’s duties to one or more of the other clients.”72
The Rule does not require such informed consent and written confirmation in instances of purely potential conflicts,73 but the Rule’s
Comments suggest that in common representation of founders, a
lawyer ought to obtain explicit consent from each client.74
Not every joint client engagement setting creates the “significant risk” identified in Rule 1.7(a)(2) or requires informed consent.
For example, if a husband and wife in a seemingly stable marriage
retain a lawyer to purchase a home together, that common representation typically would not trigger a “significant risk” that the
lawyer’s advocacy on behalf of either spouse would be impaired in
any way, so informed consent ordinarily would not be required. 75
Joint representation of founders, however, presents a different set
of circumstances, and would inevitably generate the “significant
risk” that a lawyer must address.76 Questions of ownership interests, decision making, control, vision, and exit all invite differences
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers uses founders as its example of this possibility. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 130 (2000).
73 Rule 1.7, Comment 8 notes that the “mere possibility of subsequent harm”
does not require informed consent and written confirmation. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.7 cmt. 8. Some observers have recommended that counsel
keep clients informed, and obtain consent, when such possibilities exist. See, e.g.,
Brad Andrews, Informed Consent to Multiple Representation Under Rule 1.7,
ADVOCATE, Feb. 2008, at 8. Other commentators have expressed deeper reservation about the shared representation model itself. See Bassett, supra note
44, at 390; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 186–87.
74 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (“[A] lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially
limited in the lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions
that each might take because of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others. The
conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to
the client.”).
75 Cahn & Tuttle, supra note 55, at 100–01 (“In ... contexts, such as a married couple’s purchase of a home, joint representation seems perfectly normal.
Indeed, one would hardly think of suggesting a different form of representation
where the spouses’ interests are so closely aligned.”).
76 The Restatement implies the opposite. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 (2000) (stating that joint representation of
multiple founders ordinarily does not require informed consent).
72
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of opinion and of preference among the founders. One lawyer
might not be able to accommodate all founders’ different interests
adequately in creating the structure of a business.77 At the same
time, one lawyer may—and individual lawyers or law firms regularly do78—assist three founders in a sufficiently meaningful way,
notwithstanding those inherent differences in interests to justify
the use of one counsel.79 Because the risks are significant but are
not disabling, the conflict may be waived, and the conflict must
be waived if the law firm will engage the three founders.80
In seeking informed consent, the lawyer must explain that the
interests of the three clients may diverge in the future and the
importance of accounting for that possibility at the formation stage.81
At a minimum, a lawyer representing the founders must ensure
that the clients know of that potential eventuality, even if the
founders choose not to engage with it in any deep way right now.82
Because separate lawyers would more easily advocate to protect
the longer-term interests of each founder to the exclusion of the
others, and because the joint lawyer must not do so for any one of
the founders, this representation warrants a Rule 1.7 discussion
and requires a written waiver.83
With three or more founders, one potentially significant downstream worry for each member of the group is that of the minority
squeeze out after an entity has been formed.84 Until a new entity
becomes public or otherwise has some recognizable market value,
each shareholder or member has very limited exit rights.85 Since
See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 472–74.
id. at 474; Rutledge, supra note 5, at 362–63.
79 See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 474.
80 For a discussion of the counseling process involved in obtaining informed
consent, see Tremblay, supra note 15, at 408.
81 See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 363.
82 Id. at 363–64.
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (2015); Rutledge, supra note
5, at 363–64.
84 Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law,
79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1167–68 (2010) (discussing “freeze-out” and “squeezeout” of minority shareholders); see also Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables
(or at Least Understand Why You Should): Can Better Warning and Education
of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?,
14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 493 (2009) (describing the squeeze-out possibilities); Simon, supra note 5, at 61–65.
85 Means, supra note 84, at 1208; see also Molitor, supra note 84, at 512–13, 549.
77

78 See
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profiting by a sale of their interest is not likely in the short term,
founders often expect to gain some return from the enterprise by
working in the business for a salary or obtaining dividends from
the operating profits.86 If two of the three founders choose to conspire against the third, they can terminate his employment and
cease issuing dividends without the third owner having any ability to prevent that action.87 The minority owner, being unable to
sell his interests except to the squeezing majority owners, stands
to lose much of his investment whether in capital or in labor spent
developing the business. While that kind of maneuvering would
only occur after the entity exists, any anticipation of it will occur
while the founders remain joint clients. Since no one knows at
formation which of the founders might conspire against the others,
all three clients face precisely the same risk.88 It is in the interests
of all three joint clients to address the worries by accounting for
these possibilities in any partnership agreement or the later corporate or LLC documents.89
b. Consent to Sharing Information
If there is any uncertainty surrounding the scope of the informed
consent on the conflicts question, there is no uncertainty about the
lawyer’s obligation to obtain informed consent from the founders
as to the operation of the confidentiality duties.90 Under ordinary
circumstances, a lawyer will explain to her individual client the protections afforded to him by the operation of Rule 1.6, which protects
“information related to the representation” unless some exception
applies.91 With individual representation, the world is simple: the
86 Molitor,

supra note 84, at 516–17.
Id. at 515.
88 Id. at 492. One can imagine a particularly vulnerable third client, say a
stranger joining two business partners who already work closely together. In that
setting, the lawyer needs to be more careful with joint representation duties.
89 See id. at 592 (describing provisions to address these concerns).
90 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a), (b)(7), (c) (2015).
91 Id. r. 1.6(b). While Rule 1.6(b) offers seven discrete bases on which a lawyer
may justify disclosure of otherwise confidential client information, those exceptions
are rarely employed. See Ria A. Tabacco, Note, Defensible Ethics: A Proposal to
Revise the ABA Model Rules for Criminal Defense Lawyer-Authors, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 568, 577–78 (2008); Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between Confidentiality Requirements and Contemporary
Lawyers’ Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 203–04 (2007); John K. Villa,
87
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lawyer keeps everything confidential, generally speaking.92 In common representation, that assurance must be adjusted in a critical
way, and that adjustment requires a conversation and confirmation. Rule 1.7 in its comments explains that counsel must “advise
each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will
have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to
the representation should be kept from the other.”93
The lawyer therefore will explain the absence of confidentiality
among the three founders and, in those unusual circumstances, negotiate any special arrangement chosen by the founders to withhold some information belonging to one founder from the others.94
4. Decision Making Within the Attorney-Client Relationship
Having established a joint relationship with three individual
clients, the law firm may proceed to develop counseling strategies
through which the founders will choose the form of entity to establish and the content of that entity’s organizational documents
and filings.95 By virtue of the firm having three separate retainer
agreements with three separate (if joint) clients, the lawyer must
honor the preferences of all three founders.96 The arrangement
must be clear to the three clients that their decision making must
be collective and by consensus—or, if the founders so agree, by the
group’s own chosen matrix.97 That component of the representation
What Can You Ethically Do When You Don’t Know What Ethically to Do?, 27
ACC DOCKET 106, 107 (2009) (on file with author).
92 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a).
93 Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 31.
94 As Comment 31 to Rule 1.7 describes, in unusual circumstances, the
jointly represented clients will, and may, agree with the lawyer that certain
identified information—the Comment uses trade secrets as an example—will
not be available to the team once the lawyer has learned it from one team member.
In most instances, that condition will make joint representation unworkable,
but the lawyer has discretion if the facts warrant it to continue with the representation despite that compromised position. For a discussion of that complication
in the setting of aggregate settlements, see Carol A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflections on Attorneys’ Fiduciary Obligations
and Professional Responsibility Duties, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 524 (2012).
95 That “entity” could, of course, include a partnership, should the founders
opt not to establish a more formal, publicly filed organization. Tremblay, supra
note 15, at 438.
96 Id. at 407–08.
97 Id. at 408.
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must be explicit.98 So, for example, if two of the three founders
prefer establishing an LLC, and the third strongly prefers creation of a C corporation, the lawyer will be at an impasse, unless
the client group has itself chosen a decision-making method (e.g.,
majority rule) to which it will adhere.99
Two implications follow from this fundamental reality of any
joint representation arrangement. First, the lawyer’s commitment
to neutrality becomes both more critical and more difficult to sustain.
In representing single clients, whether individuals or organizations, lawyers will typically proceed in a client-centered fashion.100
That means, as many have described,101 that the lawyer’s preferences are effectively irrelevant except to the extent that those
preferences emerge from legal obligations about which the clients
have no choice.102 Since lawyers always will have preferences, which
are not always based upon the legal principles involved but instead arise from their own values and business judgments, the
client-centered model discourages the lawyer from influencing
the client’s decision-making.103 When founders disagree among
themselves, the common lawyer must actively assist the group to
understand all of the competing considerations, and the lawyer
must be especially sensitive not to support one founder’s views
over another’s.104
Id. at 413.
law firm jointly representing two founders will face greater difficulties
if the founders do not agree on a chosen course.
100 Tremblay, supra note 15, at 397–98.
101 See ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERING PRACTICE 1–10 (2013); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS
AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 2–9 (3d ed. 2011); STEPHEN
ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 72–105 (2009) (describing an “engaged” and collaborative approach to client decision making).
102 See David Binder, Paul Bergman & Susan Price, Lawyers as Counselors:
A Client-Centered Approach, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 29, 67–69 (1990). But see
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 593 (1990).
103 ALVAREZ & TREMBLAY, supra note 101, at 113–14.
104 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 76–
86 (1978) (discussing the challenges when representing multiple clients);
Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REV. 211, 216–18 (1982); John A. Walton, Conflicts for Sports
98

99 A
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The second implication arises from the malleability of the group’s
chosen decision-making methods. As long as the group remains
an “aggregate” of three clients, and not an entity,105 any agreement among the three about how they will make decisions down
the road will have a tentative, at best, functionality. Here is the
worry: imagine that the three founders agree at the very beginning of the representation, at the lawyer’s request and with a dose
of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,106 that a founder will acquiesce in
a decision if two of the three members of the group favor it. And,
imagine further that the retainer agreement or a separate writing
confirms that commitment.107 If an outvoted founder feels strongly
about an issue that he had not previously encountered, and refuses
to acknowledge the ongoing validity of his previous agreement,
where does that leave the lawyer?
There are but two answers to that question. The most likely
result is that the attorney will mediate among her three clients to
arrive at some consensus to allow the business planning to proceed.108 Comment 32 to Model Rule 1.7 refers to the lawyer’s efforts to “adjust a relationship between [joint] clients”109 without
and Entertainment Attorneys: The Good News, the Bad News, and the Ugly Consequences, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 259, 280–81 (1998) (addressing the issue
in context).
105 If the three founders were an organization, the client would most likely
be the entity, and the lawyer would follow its decision-making systems and
protocols. See In re Wise, 740 N.E.2d 946, 950–51, 955 (Mass. 2000) (lawyer disciplined for taking action ostensibly on behalf of a nonprofit organization, but
without the consent of the duly authorized constituents).
106 Professor Vermeule describes “[a] veil of ignorance rule … [as] a rule that
suppresses self-interested behavior on the part of decisionmakers; it does so by
subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits
and burdens that will result from a decision.” Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 399 (2001) (citing JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999)).
107 See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 363.
108 An earlier iteration of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct included
a rule that anticipated a lawyer’s mediating among clients with common, but
not identical, interests. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.2 (1983)
(eliminated in the 2002 revision of the Model Rules); see also Walton, supra
note 104, at 268–73 (discussing intermediation among joint clients).
109 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 32 (2015); see also John S.
Dzienkowski, Lawyers As Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 763 (1992); Carl
A. Pierce, ABA Model Rule 2.2: Once Applauded and Widely Adopted, Then
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being a partisan for any one of them. With transparency, open dialogue, and clear written explanation detailing the role of the attorney,
mediation among clients in this manner is ethically appropriate
and likely quite common.110
If the mediation does not succeed, and the founders do not
reach consensus, then the lawyer may not represent the three
common clients any longer (assuming that the issue on which the
clients disagree may not be postponed or deferred). 111 This is the
fundamental risk of common representation: that the clients will
develop a conflict that cannot be resolved, and the lawyer will
have to withdraw from the multiple representation.112 The critical
question upon the dissolution of the common representation is
whether the lawyer may continue to represent the remaining two
founders without the informed consent of the unhappy founder,113
for there is no doubt that the law firm may continue to represent
the remaining founders with the informed consent of the departing founder.114 That question introduces generally the question of
founder mobility and “drift,” to which we now turn.
Criticized, Ignored or Evaded, Now Sentenced to Death With Few Mourners, But
Not in Tennessee, 2 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 9, 17 (2000).
110 See Walton, supra note 104, at 259, 271, 276–77, 285, 288. Failing to be
neutral while representing multiple clients may trigger liability for the lawyer.
See Nelson Bros. Prof’l Real Estate, LLC v. Freeborn & Peters, LLP, 773 F.3d
853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that, where a lawyer structured a joint
venture agreement allowing one client to outvote the second client without informing the second client, the firm was liable for malpractice); Crest Inv. Trust,
Inc. v. Comstock, 327 A.2d 891, 901, 904 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (holding
that fiduciary duties were breached when the lawyer, representing the bank
and farmers in investment and business formation, allowed farmers to enter into
investment that favored the bank without recommending that farmers seek
independent counsel).
111 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7; see also infra notes 125–26
and accompanying text.
112 See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1265–
66 (1994) (recommending better clarity within the rules); Stephen Doherty,
Comment, Joint Representation Conflicts of Interests: Toward a More Balanced
Approach, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 561, 581–82 (1992) (describing the interplay between Rules 1.7 and 1.9).
113 See, e.g., Bruce Alan Mann & Marcus D. Wilkinson, The Role of Counsel in
Venture Capital Transactions if Disputes Arise, 46 BUS. LAW. 759, 767 (1991).
114 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2015).
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C. Founder Drift
Whether a founder leaves the original group prior to the establishment of a structured, formal organization because of disagreement, a loss of interest, or the emergence of a better project
elsewhere, the attorney representing the group of founders faces
the same decision point: may she remain with the enterprise absent
one of the founders without that leaving founder’s permission?
1. The Propriety of Continuing Representation
Before we reach that question, a preliminary consideration warrants our attention. One might suggest that whenever the group
of founders reconstitutes, or whenever one of its members drifts
away, the law firm ought to withdraw from representation and
refer the enterprise to new counsel.115 This inquiry will resurface
when we reach the setting of an active business, with the founders
as partners opting to leave.116 It is seemingly safer and more conservative for a law firm to refrain from representing the group of
founders after the membership within the group has changed.
That strategy will not always be the best alternative, however.
There are three considerations that might support a law firm’s
remaining as counsel to the inchoate enterprise after a founder
departs. First, with startup businesses, it is not infrequently the
case that the founder group is fluid, with some entrepreneurs
joining a team for a while and then reassessing the best use of
their scarce time, especially in light of the lack of wages or salary
in this early stage of the inchoate business.117 If the law firm desires to stay with the business, and the remaining founders desire
to continue, it is not fair to the emerging business to require its
locating new counsel and a reprise of the informed consent dance.
Second, if the law firm is offering its services pro bono, which is
115 Some participants suggested this remedy during the Boston College Law
School summer colloquium discussion of this paper.
116 See infra notes 217–53 and accompanying text.
117 “It is an unfortunate truth, but very often the team that first embarks on
a startup concept is not the same team to finish.” Matt Faustman, Founders Leaving
the Startup, UPCOUNSEL: BLOG, https://www.upcounsel.com/blog/founders-leav
ing-the-startup [https://perma.cc/SDS3-EL5Y].
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not uncommon with inchoate startup businesses,118 there may not
be other counsel available.
Third, many law firms offer services to cash-strapped startup
enterprises through an arrangement of deferred fee payments 119
or a promised share in the equity of the later business.120 In those
settings, a shift in the array of founders that does not appear to
alter the scope of the ongoing business plan would leave the firm
anxious to remain as counsel. If that incentive is not shared by
the founders, a conflict of interest would appear to arise between
the interests of the firm and the interest of the founder clients121—a conflict that the law firm needs to address in a transparent way.122 But, often the remaining founders are more than
happy not to have to change firms,123 so the interests of the firm
and the remaining clients would align.

Pro bono legal services for transactional clients, most often startups, is
more prevalent than in the past. See James L. Baillie, Fulfilling the Promise of
Business Law Pro Bono, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1543, 1544, 1568 (2002);
Thomas H. Morsch, Discovering Transactional Pro Bono, 72 UMKC L. REV.
423, 425, 431 (2003).
119 See Sarah Boulden, Note, The Business of StartUp Law: Alternative Fee
Arrangements and Agency Costs in Entrepreneurial Law, 11 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 279, 294 (2013) (reporting that the Cooley and Moye White law
firms employ that practice).
120 For a discussion of the practice of law firms taking equity in startup
clients, see generally John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in
Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV.
405 (2002); Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and Incentives
Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Attorneys, 1999 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 329 (1999); Casey Perrino, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: What to
Do When One Must Take Equity in a Client, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 825
(2015); Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99
(2001); Gwyneth E. McAlpine, Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should
Lawyers Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients’ Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549
(1999); Thomas E. Przybylski, Note, The Ethics of Accepting Stock in a Client
as Payment for Legal Services, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1431 (2002).
121 See Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their
Corporate Clients’ Stock, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 574 (2002) (describing the sometimes distorted perceptions of lawyers in assessing those risks); Perrino, supra
note 120, at 834–35 (discussing the conflicts that arise when taking equity).
122 See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
123 See Mann & Wilkinson, supra note 113, at 775.
118
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For these reasons, we should acknowledge that at times the
firm and the remaining founders will hope to continue to work
together, and assess the ethical and logistical complications of
their doing so.
2. Founder Mobility Resulting from Conflict
Let us return to our original story and introduce founder mobility. Imagine that after the law firm has accepted the joint representation of Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, the team encounters serious
internal conflict about how the enterprise will proceed, with
Janelle and Arjun disagreeing with the strategic visions of Netia.
The efforts of Sofia Schendel, the joint clients’ counsel, to mediate
their differences do not succeed, and she concludes that she cannot
continue to represent the group of three clients. However, she hopes
to continue to work with Janelle and Arjun as they continue with
the business ideas. Imagine further that Netia ignores Sofia’s requests for explicit permission for Sofia to continue to work with the
other two original founders.
Once Netia is no longer a client, she becomes a former client of
the law firm, and the question of any proceeding representation is
addressed by Model Rule 1.9.124 Rule 1.9 would prohibit the representation by the law firm of clients (here, Janelle and Arjun) if
that representation is substantially related to that of a former client (here, Netia) and is adverse to the interests of the now-former
client.125 If those conditions are met, the law firm may proceed only
if Netia provides informed consent to the continued representation, confirmed in writing.126
In this story, the ongoing representation is substantially related to the firm’s work for Netia; indeed, it is the same work as
that performed by the law firm for Netia, and the firm likely obtained material confidential information from Netia while acting
as her lawyer.127 The critical question is whether continued representation of the “business” through Janelle and Arjun would be
124 MODEL

RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2015).

See id.
see also RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132
cmt. d(iii) (2000).
127 It is not implausible to imagine that the law firm, while representing
Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, learned virtually nothing from Netia, having had most
125

126 Id.;
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considered adverse to Netia. “Material adversity,” as the Rule 1.9
requirement has come to be known,128 tests the degree to which
the current representation may result in legal, financial, or other
identifiable detriment to the former client.129 There can be no
blanket application of the adversity condition, as it is entirely
fact-driven.130 If, after the law firm withdraws from its common
representation of Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, Netia does not pursue the enterprise for which the group formed, then the law firm
seems quite safe in accepting a retainer from Janelle and Arjun
to continue the business.
If, on the other hand, the law firm learns that Netia will pursue a similar enterprise on her own or with new collaborators, the
law firm’s predicament is more delicate if it hopes to continue with
Janelle and Arjun. There is no direct authority on which the law firm
may rely,131 but some principles provide guidance. First, even the
more strict concurrent representation conflict of interest authority, Model Rule 1.7,132 permits a law firm to represent competitors
communications with Janelle and Arjun. If that were true, is the law firm nevertheless forbidden by Rule 1.9 from proceeding without the consent of Netia because of the absence of any protected confidences? The answer appears to be
yes—the bar to representation remains. The “substantial relationship” test
within Rule 1.9 presumes the receipt of relevant information if the two matters
are substantially related. See DEBORAH L. RHODE ET AL., LEGAL ETHICS 532 (7th
ed. 2016); Doherty, supra note 112, at 582.
128 RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (2000); LISA
G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
492 (3d ed. 2012).
129 See ABA & BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., 18 LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON
PROF’L CONDUCT 205, 220–21 (2002).
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 2 (2015).
131 Authority supports the proposition that founders have fiduciary relationships to one another and the yet-to-be-formed business entity, but these authorities do not specifically address the application of these duties if Netia competes
with Janelle and Arjun, or how an attorney should ethically handle these situations. See ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS COUNSELOR’S LAW AND COMPLIANCE
PRACTICE MANUAL § 9:6 (2014); ALAN S. GUTTERMAN & JEAN L. BATMAN, 1 CAL.
TRANSACTIONS FORMS—BUS. ENTITIES § 3.2 (2016).
132 Rule 1.7 is stricter in its limitation on conflicts of interest in that, unlike
Rule 1.9, it forbids opposing a second client even if the matters are entirely
unrelated. See Kristi N. Saylors, Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 28 FAM.
L.Q. 451, 472 (1994) (“Model Rule 1.7 applies a stricter standard to conflicts
with current clients than to conflicts with former clients (Model Rule 1.9)”).
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within the same industry “whose interests are only economically
adverse.”133 Therefore, the fact that a former client enters the
same field as a competitor should not demand the law firm refrain
from representation of the remaining founders.134 On the other
hand, if Netia competes with Janelle and Arjun, and if the law
firm concludes that Janelle and Arjun will employ in a significant
fashion the confidential insights from Netia in their business
model, a different result seems appropriate. Exploiting the former
client’s confidential information to that client’s detriment is exactly what Rule 1.9(a) intends to prevent.135 That would suggest
that Sofia decline further representation of Janelle and Arjun
(and any other founder joining them to replace Netia).
That conclusion, while prudent, nevertheless remains a little
puzzling. The purpose of Rule 1.9 is to protect Netia’s confidences.
While labeled most often as a conflicts rule, Rule 1.9 serves most
directly to protect the confidences of former clients.136 That is the
driving rationale for the application of the substantial relationship test. While it may be the case that Janelle and Arjun have
used information belonging to Netia in the crafting of their business model, that sharing does not preclude Janelle and Arjun
from locating a new, separate law firm and proceeding with their
conception of the business.137 If that is true, and if it also happens
to be true that the current law firm has no personal information
from Netia that Janelle and Arjun do not have available to them
(again, quite likely), why should Janelle and Arjun change firms?
The only rationale justifying the firm’s disqualification from
continuing to represent Janelle and Arjun would be what we
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6.
Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 8.
135 See id. r. 1.9 cmts. 1, 9; see also Douglas R. Richmond, Choosing Sides:
Issue or Positional Conflicts of Interest, 51 FLA. L. REV. 383, 395–96 (1999);
John W. Allen, Conflicts of Interest—The Basics, 78 MICH. B.J. 180, 181 (1999).
136 See RHODE ET AL., supra note 127, at 472; Richmond, supra note 135, at 396;
Neil W. Hamilton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business?:
The Erosion of the Conflicts Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 71 (1998).
137 This conclusion seems inescapable. If Janelle and Arjun, after the common representation we have been considering here has concluded, approach a
new law firm for representation of their emerging business, that new law firm
may certainly accept that representation, having no connection at all to Netia.
133
134

298 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:267
might call the Brennan’s, Inc. theory, and that justification, while
weak, is not necessarily incoherent. In the well-known Brennan’s,
Inc. case, a law firm simultaneously represented two restaurateur
brothers, each with a separate business organization, within the
Brennan family in New Orleans.138 When the collaboration ended
after one brother established a competing restaurant using the
family logo, the law firm remained as counsel to that brother.139
In responding to a motion to disqualify the law firm, based on
doctrine that later emerged as Rule 1.9, the firm argued that it
was in no more advantageous posture than any new law firm would
be, and therefore should not be disqualified.140 Because any confidential client information the former counsel had access to would be
available to the successor firm, given that joint clients regularly
share information, the former counsel had obtained no advantage
that could conceivably cause harm to the former client.141 The
Fifth Circuit acknowledged that argument but disqualified the
firm nevertheless, reading a loyalty component into the Rule 1.9
doctrine along with a confidentiality component.142 Because the
two brothers’ restaurants were competitors, and, because each
wanted to use the Brennan’s logo, it was impermissibly disloyal
for the firm to choose which of the family factions—that is to say
which of its former clients—it would support.143
The Brennan’s, Inc. ruling remains good law, despite its questionable logic.144 That doctrine would deny Sofia the opportunity
to work with Janelle and Arjun after Netia leaves without waiving
any former client conflict if the adversity condition was satisfied.
138 Brennan’s,

Inc. v. Brennan’s Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir.
1979). Brennan’s, Inc. appears in several law school Professional Responsibility
textbooks; see generally, GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 457 (5th ed. 2010); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS
IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 95–98 (4th ed.
2002); LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 128, at 502.
139 Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 171.
140 Id. at 174.
141 Id. at 173.
142 Id. at 172.
143 Id.
144 The result in Brennan’s, Inc. follows from a direct application of the substantial relationship test of Rule 1.9. The Restatement also relies on the Brennan’s,
Inc. opinion in support of its interpretation of former client conflicts of interest.
See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. g (2000).
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The adversity factor is essential.145 In Brennan’s, Inc., the two formerly represented brothers’ businesses competed directly, and each
wanted access to the logo in question, so adversity was strongly
evident.146 In the scenario considered here, no business activity
exists yet with any of the founders, and Netia may or may not
succeed in establishing an ongoing enterprise. Perhaps that difference would permit the firm to continue representing the remaining founders even without the waiver, but little reported
substantive authority is available to support that proposition.147
One last observation warrants a brief discussion here before the
analysis moves on to consideration of a less contentious change of
client personnel. The above discussion assumes that the jurisdiction in question does not adhere to the rather quirky Jesse v.
Danforth doctrine. In Jesse, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that a group of founders working with a law firm to establish a
business entity, while apparently individual joint clients during
the formation stage, retroactively convert to constituents of the
entity—instead of former clients of the firm—after the entity has
been established.148 Therefore, as occurred in Jesse, the firm may
represent another client on a substantially related matter contrary to the interests of one of the founders without that founder’s
consent.149 Jesse is not followed in all states,150 and its holding
145 See id.; see also Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 172 (“A client would feel
wronged if an opponent prevailed against him with the aid of an attorney who
formally represented the client in the same matter.”).
146 See Brennan’s, Inc., 590 F.2d at 170.
147 See generally Lemaire v. Texaco, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1308 (1980) (holding that
plaintiff’s counsel was not disqualified by hiring a new attorney who previously
worked for defendant’s law firm since the new attorney refused to discuss the
case with firm members, and the difficult nature of the case would make it hard
to locate other qualified counsel); Rohm & Haas Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 187
F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that although adversity existed between
the parties, a significant delay in moving for disqualification constituted waiver);
In re Texas Windstorm Ins. Ass’n, 417 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App. 2013) (holding
that no adversity existed between association and former client of attorney
since former client was not a current party to consolidated lawsuit).
148 Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992).
149 See id. at 68–69.
150 A federal court in Minnesota, ruling on a dispute involving a Florida corporation, followed Jesse’s retroactivity analysis. See Manion v. Nagin, 394 F.3d
1062, 1069–70 (8th Cir. 2005). Delaware has declined to follow the Jesse reasoning. See, e.g., Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, Inc., 181 A.2d 579, 583–85 (Del. 1962).
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has not been adopted by the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers.151 If it were the law in this firm’s state, however, the
above analysis might change.152
3. Founder Mobility Resulting from Drift
The fact that startups often begin with a loose coalition of actors developing an idea means that from time to time the constitution of the founding group will evolve, with some participants
drifting away to other projects and new helpers showing up. 153
That “drift” phenomenon has important consequences for the law
firm. Once the firm has identified its joint clients, and has entered
into formal written retainer agreements with them, a change in
the composition of the group requires a corresponding reworking
of the retainers.154 The new retainer also triggers the need to review
the informed consent agreement regarding the joint representation,
especially (but seemingly not solely) for any newly engaged jointly
represented client.155 The firm also ought to formally end the representation agreement with the departing member of the entrepreneurial team.156
With “drift,” in contrast to the explicit disagreement among
the founders discussed above, the firm typically has less to worry
about its continued representation of the remaining founders. The
absence of disagreement does not mean that the firm can simply
forget about or ignore the interests of the drifting-away entrepreneur,
151 See

RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 cmt. d
(2000) (describing Jesse as “consistent with the Section and Comment,” but not
adopting the retroactivity principle).
152 It is not self-evident that the analysis would change in a Jesse jurisdiction, however. The Jesse principle would necessarily hold that during the preincorporation representation the individuals who later, after incorporation, will
retroactively become non-clients will be full clients until that time. Otherwise,
if those persons never had individual client status, the “retroactivity” notion
would have no meaning. See Jesse, 485 N.W.2d at 67–68; J. S. Nelson, The
Corporate Conspiracy Vacuum, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 297 (2015).
153 See Faustman, supra note 117.
154 See RUPA § 801 cmt. 1 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997)
(“Even if the business of the partnership is continued by some of the partners,
it is technically a new partnership.”).
155 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 2 (2015).
156 Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 4 (“If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation[.]”).
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however. A participant who served as a client for a period of time
and then stops working with the team because of a change in
plans or a loss of interest may nevertheless still have some claims
to the fruits of the resulting enterprise.157 The firm must address
those possible rights, both in its communication with the departing founder and in its renewed agreement with the remaining
founders.158 The fact that the departing founder may have some
claims to share in the resulting success of the enterprise does not
inherently present any conflict of interest for the firm’s ongoing
work, as the success of the startup benefits the former client as
well as the ongoing clients.159 Therefore, no waiver of conflicts by
the former or current clients would be necessary except in two
circumstances: (1) the continued business would compete directly
with the drifting founder,160 or (2) the remaining founders cannot
agree on the share of the enterprise to which the departing founder
will later be entitled.161
The first of those two circumstances puts the law firm in the
same posture as when the departing founder leaves because of a
disagreement, as explored above. The second circumstance places
the law firm in a challenging position. To appreciate that difficulty,
imagine this example: Janelle, Arjun, and Netia, the three founders
of the inchoate business, retain Sofia and her law firm for common
representation, and the firm agrees to represent the three entrepreneurs individually. After the team has worked together for a few
weeks, Netia gradually but noticeably stops participating in the
group’s planning and development. Efforts by the remaining team
members to reengage Netia do not succeed. The team finally agrees
that it ought to replace Netia with a new team member, Rica.
The law firm’s response ought to be to confirm with Netia, in
writing, her choice to leave the team and the consequential cessation
See Ale & McKinney, supra note 8, at 479–80.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 2.
159 Id. r. 1.7(b)(3).
160 The analysis in the text assumes that in the “drift” context the departing
founder simply moves on to other activities, which contrasts with the situation
discussed earlier where an irreconcilable difference arises, requiring the joint representation to cease. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Of course, that
assumption may not apply to some of the drift settings, so the earlier disagreementdriven analysis could apply in this setting as well.
161 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4).
157
158
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of the representation.162 The firm must also counsel Rica, along
with the remaining original founders, about the implications of the
new joint representation agreement among Janelle, Arjun, and
Rica.163 Those two activities relate, in this way: the informed consent discussion surrounding the joint representation including
Rica inevitably invites consideration of the remaining interests (if
any) of Netia, the law firm’s former client. Sofia, the lawyer counseling the team about the new joint representation, must not undermine her former client’s interests during that deliberation. In fact,
Sofia might choose, in her confirming letter or email to Netia, to
explicate the rights and interests Netia continues to possess, or
might continue to possess, in the team’s enterprise.164 The remaining members of the team might prefer that the lawyer not inform
the departing founder of any such interests, but that preference
cannot affect the lawyer’s responsibilities to her former client.165
If the lawyer and the remaining team members disagree about
the rights and interests of Netia, the lawyer’s response to that
disagreement will depend on the clarity and soundness of Netia’s
Rule 1.16 applies whenever a lawyer stops representation prior to its
natural completion, and its permissive withdrawal provisions would most likely
operate here. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(6) (stating that
attorney withdrawal is permitted when “the representation ... has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client”). The “drift” story resembles (but is
also distinctly different from) the situation where a lawyer loses contact with
a client in the middle of a matter. At least two state bar ethics committees have
addressed the responsibilities of a lawyer whose client has disappeared. See
Alaska Ethics Op. 2011-4, 2011 WL 2410520 (2011), https://www.alaskabar.org
/servlet/content/11_4.html [https://perma.cc/5V9N-T4JM] (requiring a “reasonable
inquiry”); Ill. St. Bar Ass’n Advisory Opinion on Prof’l Conduct No. 03-04 (2004)
(advising the lawyer to “use due diligence in conducting an investigation” to
locate the client or the needed facts if the representation must proceed); see
also Karen Erger, The Client that Got Away, 92 ILL. B.J. 433 (2004); Allison E.
Williams, Missing Clients: What to Do When Your Client Has Vanished, 28 J.
LEGAL PROF. 247 (2004).
163 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 29.
164 As the above discussion indicated, the “drift” scenario finds the law firm
withdrawing, permissibly, from an ongoing representation. Rule 1.16(d) states
that the “lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect
[the] client’s interests” upon such termination of representation. MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(d). That obligation arguably requires the lawyer to
inform his client of her status as a former member of the founders’ team.
165 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(d).
162
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interests notwithstanding her having drifted away. If Netia’s interests in the ultimate business enterprise are not clearly assured
under the circumstances, which is not at all unlikely,166 then the
lawyer may proceed with her representation of the remaining founders without advising Netia that she might have some later claims
to some stake in the business.167 If Netia possesses clear interests,
but the remaining founders prefer that the lawyer withhold that
information from Netia, then a conflict exists that might require
the joint representation to end.168
Netia’s arguments that she is entitled to share in the success of the resulting enterprise after having participated at the earliest stages of the business’s development, and having voluntarily drifted away before the business
began operations, are not self-evidently strong. Her rights under partnership
law (if the enterprise qualified as one, which it does not) would be limited, so
her rights without partnership entitlements would be even less. Under RUPA,
Netia would be entitled to a fair distribution of her share of the partnership
net assets at the time she departs. See RUPA §§ 601(7), 603, 701, 801(1) (NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). If she has departed before the partnership has any measurable value, her later claims to a share of increased
value would have little chance of success. For her copyright interests, see infra
note 284 and accompanying text.
167 The lawyer in this story has three possible choices in her Rule 1.16–
generated communication with Netia: (1) actively encourage Netia to pursue
claims that might have merit; (2) advise Netia that she may, but also may not,
have claims, but the lawyer may not advocate for or against Netia on that question; or (3) omit any mention of possible claims. Option (1) is simply not acceptable, as it favors one of the original joint clients over the others—a stance
the lawyer committed to avoid when she accepted the common representation
originally. The remaining founders prefer Option (3), of course. Sofia will also
prefer Option (3) (since she continues to represent the remaining founders, but
not Netia), and she will choose it if it is an ethically proper alternative. It appears to be ethically proper. Because it is not certain that Netia has any viable
claims at all, and because Sofia’s joint representation agreement requires that
she use her best efforts to maintain a careful neutrality among her several
clients, no authority would condemn the lawyer for a failure to upset the delicate balance by encouraging her now-former client to pursue claims that her
current clients hope will not be pursued. See Marc Pilcher, Note, “You’re Killing Independent George”: When Professionalism and Business Worlds Collide,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 829, 834 (1999) (describing the duties owed to former
clients after joint representation).
168 Because of the usual requirement that the lawyer share information
among jointly represented clients, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7
cmt. 31 (2015), the law firm may have an obligation not just to withdraw from
the common representation, but to share with Rica information about the strategy learned from the remaining founders. AM. C. OF TR. & EST. COUNS. FOUND.,
166
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III. REPRESENTING FOUNDERS OF ACTIVE FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISES
It is surely true that in some representational contexts involving
multiple founders, but not all such contexts, the group of founders
will constitute a partnership.169 The lawyer will typically encounter
a mutually exclusive choice: either her group constitutes a partnership, or not, with no intermediate alternative available. Part III
examines the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer when she concludes that the group with whom she works qualifies as a partnership. Those responsibilities will be different in some important
ways from her duties in working with multiple individuals.
A. Discerning When the Group Qualifies as a Partnership
Because it matters in significant ways, the lawyer ought to be
able to determine whether Janelle, Arjun, and Netia are partners,
or not. We encountered this question above,170 and that discussion
concluded that while the choice may be mutually exclusive, it is
not always self-evident. In some settings the partnership qualities will be clear. If the business is operational, directed by more
than one founder, with contributions from those directing founders, and an agreement for shared ownership and responsibility for
the profits (when they come) and losses, the lawyer ought to proceed as though she has encountered a partnership by operation of
law.171 If the business is not yet operational, but merely a brainstorm that awaits development with no intentions yet to share
profits and losses, the lawyer may assume with little risk that the
founders come to her as individuals.172
In many settings, especially with nascent startup operations, it
will not be clear to the lawyer which category best fits the activity
she observes. Commentators often note the lack of precision in the
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 75 (4th ed. 2006); see
also Kevin H. Michels, What Conflicts Can Be Waived? A Unified Understanding of Competence and Consent, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 109, 164 (2012).
169 Darby, supra note 39, at 326 (“One must look to the intent of the parties,
the facts of the association, the rights of the parties, and profit-sharing to determine on a case-by-case basis if a partnership does exist.”).
170 See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text.
171 HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.05.
172 Id. § 2.06.
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substantive law regarding whether a partnership exists or not,173
so it is no surprise that a lawyer at the early stages of an enterprise
will experience that uncertainty. In the face of ambiguity, the lawyer
ought to err on the side of treating the participants as individuals.
One might suggest that in those ambiguous contexts the lawyer and the founders simply should negotiate among themselves
and choose the favored categorization, with a retainer agreement
memorializing that choice. That suggestion fails for two reasons.
First, the counseling process and the lawyering work needed to
discern the best way to proceed require that the lawyer already
have some client relationship with the participants,174 so the suggestion is, in that way, question-begging. Presumably, the group
will soon enough select some formal entity through which to conduct the business, so the questions we face here apply only to the
earliest stages of the lawyer’s work with the participants.175 Second, it is not entirely clear that the founders may autonomously
choose a category if the underlying substantive law does not support it, and such an election might introduce subtle risks to the
participants if they ultimately make the wrong choice.176
Instead, the lawyer must discern independently, using her best
legal judgment, whether to proceed as though the founders are
individuals or an entity. A prudent lawyer will discuss this ontological puzzle with the founders, and she will likely explain how
the group’s later agreements will resolve any present ambiguities.
Where she is not entirely sure which category best fits, she ought
to err on the side of no partnership. One reason for this conclusion
is that the substantive law of partnership presumes no partnership.177 A participant who claims to be a partner bears the burden
Id. § 2.01(A); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 104; see also Anthony J. Luppino,
Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership Uncertainties to Facilitate UniversityGenerated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 367, 404–18 (2009).
174 See Burman, Forming the Lawyer-Client Relationship, supra note 6, at
46–47.
175 Id. at 48–49.
176 For instance, if the participants opt to proceed for the time being as if
they constituted a partnership, but they were not in fact a partnership, some
founders might have relied on commitments that may not be enforceable. See,
e.g., Fenwick v. Unemp. Compensation Comm’n, 44 A.2d 172, 174–75 (N.J.
1945) (holding no partnership existed despite participants using that term).
177 HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.02(B); but see id. § 2.07(A)–(C).
173
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of proving each of the partnership elements.178 The other reason
for the lawyer to treat the founders as individual clients when she is
uncertain of the application of partnership law principles is grounded
in the strategic planning insight that recommends keeping as many
options open as possible or, put another way, seeking to foreclose
as few options as possible.179 The individual client model does not
foreclose any structuring that the participants might desire, while
a partnership model imposes default obligations that might be inappropriate for the group.180
B. How the Partnership Identity Affects the Firm’s Responsibility
Let us turn to those settings where the lawyer is sufficiently
confident that the group of founders is indeed a partnership, even
if the founders do not yet know that fact.181 The next undertaking
for the law firm is to articulate how representation of a partnership, at the startup level, is different in a substantive way from
representation of the individual founders who possess only an inchoate business idea. We begin with an elementary legal ethics
principle: the representation of a partnership does not mean representation of the individual partners, absent a separate agreement.182 As we shall see in a moment, this fundamental precept
is not as well-established or accepted as some authorities might
178 Id. § 2.02(B); Woods v. Wills, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1185 (E.D. Mo. 2005).
Where partnership must be established by operation of law, proof must be by
“‘clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the purported partners have made
a definite and specific agreement.’” Id. (quoting Morrison v. Labor and Indus.
Relations Comm’n, 23 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)).
179 See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS
FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 298 (1978).
180 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 125–33 (describing capital contribution requirements, division of profits and losses, and liability responsibilities
that accompany default partnerships).
181 See Luppino, supra note 173, at 408 (discussing “[a]ccidental or [i]ll[d]efined [p]artnerships” and “the possibility of accidental or inadvertent creation of a partnership”).
182 The ABA treats “a lawyer who represents a partnership” as representing
“the entity rather than the individual partners,” stating that “[b]oth case authority and commentary support the treatment of partnerships as entities separate from their owners” for purposes of the attorney-client relationship. ABA
Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991); see also
Keatinge, supra note 6, at 391–92.
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imply, but it states a fundamental guiding principle.183 It is the
primary difference between the inchoate setting and the active
business setting.184
If the law firm agrees to represent the partnership, and if the
partnership qualifies as an entity,185 then the firm would identify
the client as the entity (the business) operating as a partnership.186
The firm would then proceed by analogy to any other entity that it
represented, using the guidance of Model Rule 1.13.187 The individuals would not be clients of the firm (absent some separate agreement for a separate individually driven legal matter),188 and the
direction for the legal work would come from the “duly authorized
constituents.”189 In theory at least, the firm could choose to oppose
any of the founders in an adversary proceeding so long as that
new action did not hamper the firm’s work for the entity.190 Articulating that scenario shows its unlikelihood in the context of a
small startup, but conceptually it is basically a sound proposition.
Representing the partnership entity rather than the three founders as joint clients would be easier in this way: the firm would not
need to obtain informed consent to the joint representation, although
See Keatinge, supra note 6, at 391–94.
Unlike startups, active businesses usually retain independent counsel to
represent the entire entity. See John M. Cunningham, Helping Businesses Get
Started, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 9–12 (discussing unique legal challenges faced by startups).
185 See, e.g., Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994) (“There is no
logical reason to distinguish partnerships from corporations or other legal entities in determining the client a lawyer represents.”) (quoting ABA Comm’n
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991)).
186 The fact that the business may not yet have a name, or any other coherent
identity beyond the founders’ work together, does not matter for present purposes.
The firm would need to determine how to refer to this client in its database.
187 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (2015).
188 Rule 1.13 confirms that a lawyer who represents an organization may
also represent one or more of its constituents on an individual basis, as long as
no disabling conflict of interest arises by virtue of the dual representation. See
id. r. 1.13(a), (g); Frank Settelmeyer & Sons, Inc. v. Smith & Harmer, Ltd., 197
P.3d 1051, 1059 (Nev. 2008) (finding no conflict of interest in representing corporation and majority shareholder in dissolution action); Campbell v. McKeon,
905 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (App. Div. 2010) (similar to the court in Smith & Harmer).
189 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a).
190 See Responsible Citizens v. Super. Ct. of Fresno, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756,
766–67 (1993).
183
184
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the firm would have a duty to share information with all of the
founders if the entity were a true partnership, as this discussion
assumes it is.191 The firm would need to explain to the partners
the distinction between individual representation and entity representation, with any “corporate Miranda warnings” contemplated
by Rule 1.13(f),192 as well as the need for information-sharing
among the partners.193 But the responsibility would be to inform
the constituents, and not to obtain any consent from them as a
condition of proceeding.194 If any constituent did not like what she
or he heard, the only remedy would be for the entity to decline the
representation—but, of course, any other lawyer would be in precisely the same situation, so the entity does not have a “choice”
between these conditions.195
A second significant difference between joint representation and
entity representation appears in consideration of decision-making
protocols. If the firm represented all three founders as joint clients, the firm could not implement a legal strategy if one of the
A lawyer for a general partnership ordinarily has a duty to share relevant information with the partners, even if she does not represent the partners
personally. See RUPA § 403(c) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997);
see also Wortham & Van Liew v. Super. Ct. of San Diego, 223 Cal. Rptr. 725,
728–29 (1987) (holding the lawyer must disclose to third partner all information regarding the partnership, when lawyer represented a three-member
partnership); Birmingham Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 87-7 (1987);
Thomas E. Rutledge & Phuc H. Lu, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Pitfalls
for Counsel to a Business Organization About to Be Governed by a New Law,
45 BRANDEIS L.J. 755, 777–78 (2007).
192 Rule 1.13(f) requires that a lawyer representing an organization “explain
the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom
the lawyer is dealing.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(f); see also
United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 604–05 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing this
as a “so-called Upjohn or corporate Miranda warning”).
193 Nothing in Rule 1.13(f) requires, by that rule’s language, an explanation
about the lawyer’s responsibility to share partnership information with all partners, but the analogy to that similar duty with joint clients is plain. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 31; see also supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (explaining that a lawyer who did not give notice to the partners
of the plan to share information would not have acted as a prudent representative
of the entity client).
194 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 18, 19, 31 (discussing informed consent).
195 Id.
191
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clients opposed that strategy, because of the firm’s unalloyed loyalty to each client.196 In representation of an entity, by contrast,
a firm may implement a strategy over the objections of one of the
constituents, as long as the entity’s “duly authorized constituents”
approve the strategy.197 In this way, entity representation is, conceptually at least, easier for the law firm than joint representation
because the lawyers need not worry about having to withdraw
from all representations if the founders disagree. But “easier” is
not the same as “easy.” With partnerships by default, discerning a
decision-making structure is not self-evident.198 Nor is determining who serves as the entity’s “duly authorized constituents.”199
According to RUPA, management of a partnership operates through
majority rule of the partners.200 Therefore, absent an agreement
otherwise (and in the settings we consider here, by default there
is unlikely to be any such agreement), the firm has the authority
and the duty to implement the decisions of two of the three partners notwithstanding the disagreement of the third.201
C. Partner Mobility: Drift and Breakdown
With founders who are deemed to be partners, just as with
those who are an aggregate of individuals, the prospect of fluidity
remains real.202 The lawyer’s response to a partner leaving, either
See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. This hypothetical assumes
there is no binding, articulated agreement among the founders for a decisionmaking protocol.
197 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a).
198 Because default partnerships arise without any planning or necessary
forethought by the partners, the chances are high that no decision-making protocol will have been chosen by the team members. See Rutledge & Lu, supra
note 191, at 772–75 (describing the client in a partnership).
199 Id. at 770–72 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (1982,
amended 1989)).
200 RUPA § 407(j) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997) (“A difference
arising as to a matter in the ordinary course of business of a partnership may
be decided by a majority of the partners.”); see generally Claudia M. Landeo &
Kathryn E. Spier, Shotguns and Deadlocks, 31 YALE J. REG. 143 (2014).
201 See Casey Ranch Ltd. P’ship v. Casey, 773 N.W.2d 816, 821 (S.D. 2009)
(acknowledging that the default rule is that a majority controls); Covalt v. High,
675 P.2d 999, 1002 (N.M. 1983) (finding made under the New Mexico Uniform
Partnership Act).
202 See generally Ale & McKinney, supra note 8.
196
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because of drift or because of active disagreement, will be different
when the representation involves a partnership.
While the departure of one joint client participating in an
emerging startup creates complications for the firm, and may deny
the firm the privilege of continuing with the remaining founders,
the departure of an entity constituent does not so directly affect
the representation, assuming (and this is a critical assumption)
that the partnership continues its enterprise through the remaining
partners. That conclusion follows from the essential understanding
of representing an entity. The departure of a shareholder from an
established corporation does not affect the firm’s continued representation of the corporation if the board so chooses.203 Similarly, the
departure of a member from an LLC has no direct effect on any
ongoing legal work if the managers desire the continued representation.204 Therefore, entity representation would appear to offer the firm a more stable basis for uninterrupted production of
assigned legal work from the business.
With a general partnership, however, the matter is considerably more complicated. The older Uniform Partnership Act held that
the departure of any partner dissolved the partnership. 205 RUPA
changed that doctrine, introducing the concept of “dissociation” to
address those scenarios where one partner departs but the partnership business continues through the remaining partners.206 When
a partner dissociates under RUPA, most often the partnership
will continue, and the dissociating partner will leave with her share
of the partnership assets, arranged effectively as a buyout.207 Unfortunately, for the lawyer working with startup founders, RUPA’s
203 A

change in ownership of a corporation does not affect the organization’s
lawyer’s duty to the organizational client. See, e.g., Bryan Corp. v. Abrano, 52
N.E.3d 95, 100–02 (Mass. 2016) (disqualifying a corporation’s lawyer after suing corporation when new board took control); Goodrich v. Goodrich, 960 A.2d
1275, 1285 (N.H. 2008) (holding that a corporation with new ownership gained
attorney-client privilege with the law firm that represented corporation previously); Christopher C. Wang, Comment, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Allocating
Fees from the Unfinished Business of a Professional Corporation, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1367, 1374 (1997).
204 See Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 674–75 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding LLC member did not have unilateral right to force a cessation of business).
205 See UPA § 29 (CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 1914).
206 RUPA § 801(1) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
207 Id. § 701; see also Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire,
Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1391 (2006).
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dissociation option will not easily apply, as explained below,208
which means that the partnership would often dissolve when a
partner leaves the enterprise through drift or disagreement.209
RUPA distinguishes between “at-will”210 and “term”211 partnerships. The partnership established by operation of law by the activity
of a group of startup founders will inevitably be an at-will partnership, as no separate agreement would have been established.212 The
dissociation option does not apply to an at-will partnership except
where the dissociated partner has been expelled by the other partners for various identified reasons or in identified circumstances.213
A partner simply leaving an at-will partnership does not trigger
RUPA’s dissociation alternative, which means that the partnership must dissolve, just as under the older UPA doctrine.214 Only
if all of the parties agree, including the departing partner, may
the original partnership continue.215
Let us apply this to the AddicTrak example introduced above,216
starting with the “drift” scenario and then comparing that to the
disagreement scenario.
1. Partner Drift
As we saw when the founders were not yet a partnership, after
the team has worked together for several weeks after the first
meeting with counsel (and before any final action has occurred to
create a formal entity), Netia gradually but noticeably stops participating in the group’s planning and development. Efforts by the
remaining team members to re-engage Netia do not succeed. The
RUPA § 101 cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
Id. § 801(1).
210 Id. § 101(8) (“‘Partnership at will’ means a partnership in which the partners have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration of a definite term
or the completion of a particular undertaking.”).
211 Id. (explaining that RUPA does not expressly define term partnerships,
but its definition of at-will partnerships identifies the concept by implication.).
212 Id. § 101 cmt. (“Presumptively, every partnership is an at-will partnership.”).
213 Id. § 801(1).
214 Id. See Val Ricks, Self-Help in the Break-Up of Informal Partnerships, 12
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 259, 262–63 (2014).
215 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 170; Ricks, supra note 214, at 265–66.
216 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
208
209
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team finally agrees that it ought to replace Netia with a new team
member, Rica. Sofia, the team’s lawyer, must now reassess her
representational responsibilities.
The partnership that Sofia represents is an at-will partnership,
because it has no term.217 Netia’s having left the team may reasonably be seen as her withdrawal from the partnership,218 and not because of an expulsion under circumstances addressed by RUPA.219
Her departure therefore dissolves the partnership, and Sofia now
represents a dissolving, winding-up entity.220 The remaining partners have two options, assuming, as is quite likely, that they want
to continue their nascent and emerging business, albeit without
Netia. One option is to obtain Netia’s express agreement to continue the partnership, an option permitted by RUPA.221 In the
“drift” scenario, Netia likely has no objection to the remaining
partners continuing with AddicTrak,222 but her silence seemingly
See Bendalin v. Youngblood & Assocs., 381 S.W.3d 719, 740 (Tex. App.
2012); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 167.
218 Netia’s dissociation would be based on her partners’ “having notice of
[Netia’s] express will to withdraw as a partner.” RUPA § 601(1) (NAT’L CONF.
OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). That notice need not be in writing. See Robert W.
Hillman, RUPA and Former Partners: Cutting the Gordian Knot with Continuing
Partnership Entities, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 15–16 (1995) (analyzing this
question under RUPA). According to RUPA, a person has notice of a fact when the
person “knows of it; has received a notification of it; or has reason to know it exists
from all of the facts known to the person at the time in question.” RUPA § 102(b)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997). Partners may require that notice be in writing in their partnership agreement if they choose. Id. § 103(b)(6).
219 RUPA permits dissociation to occur rather than dissolution if the partners expel the departing partner for reasons expressed in the partnership
agreement or through a judicial order based on the departing partner’s “material breach of ... a duty owed to the partnership.” Id. § 601(2)–(3), 601(5). Because
the setting discussed in the text involves a default partnership with no written
agreement, the former expulsion option does not apply. And the partners are
very unlikely to seek a court order because of one of their group members
drifted away, so the latter option is equally inapplicable.
220 Id. § 803 (explaining that partners participate in winding-up process);
see also Rutledge & Lu, supra note 191, at 770–71.
221 RUPA § 802(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
222 In the informal, pre-entity startup setting, it is quite likely that Netia
does not know that she is (or was) a partner or what the dissolution or dissociation implications are of her new lack of engagement.
217
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is not sufficient.223 She needs to agree that the business will continue without her.224 An email from Netia should suffice.225
A cautious lawyer might consider the option of communicating
to Netia, after she has stopped participating in the enterprise, to
confirm in writing the firm’s conclusion that Netia has left the
first partnership voluntarily, that the remaining partners wish to
continue to pursue the enterprise’s business model, and that the
firm intends to remain as counsel to the partnership. Sofia might
perceive such a letter or email as providing the necessary hindsight clarity should a dispute about the departure arise in the future, after the business has become prominent or profitable. Whether
such a writing serves the strategic purposes of the firm is a question that will turn on the facts and circumstances of the enterprise and the firm’s relationship with Netia. For purposes of this
discussion about the lawyer’s responsibilities, the ethics question
is whether Sofia has any right to communicate with Netia without
the permission of Janelle and Arjun. The answer to that question
appears to be probably yes.
Netia has never been a client of Sofia, but only a constituent
of Sofia’s organizational client, the partnership. She is therefore
not a former client.226 Model Rule 1.6(a) limits what Sofia may
disclose to others outside of the organization.227 While Netia was
a partner, Sofia could communicate with her about partnership
matters without any consent of the other partners, as she did
have a right under partnership law to information about the partnership business during her time as a partner.228 She is now no
longer a partner. After Netia ceases to be a partner, the ordinary
application of the confidentiality rule would conclude that Sofia
may not communicate about the enterprise’s business affairs
223

RUPA § 802(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).

224 Id.

All of the partners must waive the rights to have the partnership terminated to avoid dissolution. Id. That provision does not require that the waiver
be in writing. Id. Even if that is a fair reading of the law, it is common to accept
email as sufficient written notice. See, e.g., Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes
Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2014).
226 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
227 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2012) (Information may not
be disclosed outside of the client relationship without client consent.).
228 See RUPA § 403(b), (c) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
225
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without the informed consent of the management of the client.229
But Sofia has no “client” except for the dissolving partnership,
which, according to RUPA, “continues after dissolution only for
the purpose of winding up its business.”230 And all partners, except those who have wrongfully dissociated, “may participate in
winding up the partnership’s business.”231 Therefore, Sofia may
communicate with Netia about partnership affairs just as she
does with Janelle and Arjun, at least to the extent that Netia
needs to know partnership information or have access to the partnership’s books and records.232
The second option, if Netia does not agree to the continuation
of the partnership, is for Sofia to recognize the reconstituted
group of founders as a new partnership, with Janelle, Arjun, and
Rica as the partners.233 Nothing prevents Janelle and Arjun from
starting a new partnership, of course,234 but that would be a new
entity. The firm must acknowledge, though, that the dissolved
partnership is now a former client, and the successor partnership
is a new client, requiring a new retainer in writing.235 The critical
point is that the dissolution of the partnership leaves the law firm
without any client at all, until it establishes a relationship with
one or more of the original partners.236 Presumably, in the “drift”
scenario, Netia will neither be competing directly with her former
team members, nor have any objection to a new partnership arising.
But, of course, she may. To appreciate Netia’s rights as a former
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a).
RUPA § 802(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997); see also
Arnold M. Wensinger, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Breakup Provisions:
Stability or Headache?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 905, 928 (1993).
231 RUPA § 803(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
232 It is true that partnerships by default operate by majority rule. Id.
§ 401(j). However, a majority of partners may not vote to deny a minority partner access to information or the partnership’s books. Id. § 103(b)(2) (partners
may not “unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under
Section 403(b)”); Landeo & Spier, supra note 200, at 154.
233 See Clay B. Wortham, Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Anomalies of a
Simplified, Modernized Partnership Law, 92 KY. L.J. 1083, 1089–90 (2004).
234 See id.
235 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (2002); supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
236 RUPA permits the dissolving partnership to continue to operate during
the winding-up period. See RUPA § 803 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST.
L. 1997). But, no entity exists after the dissolution has been effected. Id.
229
230
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partner while the other founders establish a new partnership, let
us turn to the question of partner fluidity through disagreement,
for which the potential conflicts between Netia and her other
partners are more apparent.
2. Partner Disagreement
Imagine, similar to the above discussion in which the participants were individual joint clients,237 that after the law firm has
accepted the representation of the partnership of Janelle, Arjun,
and Netia, the team encounters serious internal conflict about how
the enterprise will proceed, with Janelle and Arjun disagreeing with
the strategic visions of Netia. The efforts of Sofia, the partnership’s
counsel, to mediate the differences among the partners do not succeed. Whereas in the joint representation context that disagreement
required the withdrawal of the law firm from continued representation, in the partnership setting Sofia may proceed while taking
direction from the majority of partners.238 But let us assume now
that Netia announces that she will leave the partnership.
The same analysis applies as described above when Netia drifted
away, in that the partnership cannot remain in place without Netia’s
express permission,239 which in the conflict setting is even less
likely. Therefore, the option for Janelle and Arjun, with Rica now
joining the team, is to form a new partnership, which Sofia would
presumptively represent. Similarly, nothing prevents Netia from
starting a new business in any fashion, including with Rashad as
a partner, forming a new partnership.240 Those two partnerships
(Janelle, Arjun, and Rica; Netia and Rashad) could compete directly, as long as the competition was “fair, meaning in large part
that it does not involve use of confidential information and trade
secrets.”241 The duty of loyalty that all partners possessed during the
See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text.
RUPA § 401(j). Recall that the startup story here assumes no written
partnership agreement that would alter the common or statutory law governing partnership management.
239 Id.
240 J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND
THE LLC IN A NUTSHELL 251 (3d ed. 2005).
241 Id.
237
238
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life of the partnership does not prevent direct competition after the
partnership has dissolved.242 RUPA states that “a partner is free
to compete immediately upon an event of dissolution ... unless the
partnership agreement otherwise provides.”243 Because the partnerships considered here are formed by default, no such partnership
agreement will interfere with the right to compete immediately, as
long as the secrets of each partner are respected.244
That analytic reading of the legal ethics and partnership doctrines triggers some rather complicated practical implications for
Sofia and her law firm, given the fluid nature of the work occurring both within the business and in the law firm. If Netia chooses
to leave and provides clear notice in advance of her intention to
dissociate from the partnership,245 then the firm will respond by
preparing to lose its client (the partnership) on the date of the
dissociation, subject to any wind-up, and can choose whom it will
seek to represent after that date.246 But that carefully planned
dissociation is not likely to occur during the beginning stages of a
startup operation, where friends and colleagues work together to
see if a business idea has legs. Netia may respond to her disagreements with Janelle and Arjun by employing passive-aggressive
tactics, participating less in the business, and telling another
member of the team that she no longer wishes to be part of the
enterprise. Determining exactly when the original client has lost
242

Id.

243 RUPA

§§ 404 cmt. 2, 603(b)(2).
one determines what information that Netia brought to the original
partnership would qualify as a trade secret or confidential information is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of that topic, see Robert W. Hillman,
Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and Lawyer Mobility: Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 449, 459–60 (2011); see also
Luppino, supra note 173, at 374. Understanding the scope of any such trade
secrets or confidential information would be critical for the law firm if it intends
to continue to work with one of the resulting new partnerships, as its representational duties will be limited by the constraints of those secrets.
245 Not surprisingly, RUPA’s protocols contemplate a partner’s explicit and
overt dissociation, as its teachings tend to apply to active businesses with assets, property, debt, and so on. With startups composed of participants who
may not know that they are partners, the leaving may be less formal and explicit. See RUPA § 801.
246 Id. § 801(1).
244 How
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its identity will not be easy for the firm, and avoiding giving advice
to the successor partnership will be almost impossible.247
The firm could anticipate this eventuality in its original retainer agreement, perhaps. That agreement would identify the
client as the partnership, and the three founders as general partners, unless and until a different entity has been established. Absent
a written partnership agreement (which may never materialize if
the founders agree rather soon to establish a different entity such
as an LLC), the partners will decide matters with equal authority
and own the business equally. The retainer may proceed to state
that if any partner chooses to leave the enterprise, that departure
will most likely dissolve the partnership, and the firm may negotiate any future retainer with the remaining partners or with the
partner who has left. The retainer agreement could then include
a warning to the partners that the firm will use its best efforts to
determine when an automatic dissolution has occurred, and will
seek to avoid offering advice, other than wind-up advice,248 to the
partners after any such dissolution has occurred, until the participants understand whom the firm will represent going forward.
The engagement letter or retainer agreement could also include
notice that any advice provided by the firm to any partners after
dissolution without knowledge of the dissolution may not be used
by any former partner of the former client to limit the firm’s
choices of representation in the future.249 It is not entirely clear
Under more conventional circumstances, winding-up the partnership
“entails selling its assets, paying its debts, and distributing the net balance, if
any, to the partners in cash according to their interests.” Id. § 801 cmt. 2.
248 For a discussion of the role of the partnership lawyer in the wind-up process, see Mark J. Fucile, Keeping Company: Representing Start-Up Business in
Good Times and Bad, OR. ST. B. (Apr. 2002), https://www.osbar.org/publica
tions/bulletin/02apr/company.htm [https://perma.cc/LPB4-Y5WZ] (discussing
potential attorney conflicts in dissolution); 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 440, Westlaw
(database updated September 2016) (noting that a partnership continues through
dissolution as to third parties).
249 It is important to understand that the law firm may not learn that Netia
has left the partnership until several weeks after that development has occurred. The partnership may have dissolved by the default operation of RUPA
without the lawyers having advised about either the dissolution or the default
formation of a new partnership among the remaining founders. The intent of the
language suggested in the text would be to preclude Netia from claiming that
the law firm provided advice to her after she was no longer a constituent of the
247
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that such self-protective language would have much relevant substance,250 but it does not appear that including that warning, should
the firm so choose, violates any ethical duty or common law doctrine
prospectively limiting a law firm’s liability for malpractice.251
Whether the firm would choose to include in its retainer agreement such a direct treatment of future partner departures is a
judgment call for the firm weighing the risks of not covering the
topic and the worries generated by raising the matter so early in
the relationship.252
Law firms representing true ground-level startups, and especially pro bono firms working with those businesses with the fewest assets and the least developed business plans, might find that
“the drift” described here happens with some regularity within
the loosely organized groups of entrepreneurs who come to the
lawyers with their embryonic new business ideas.253 If drift is a
client and, therefore, that she qualified as a former client under Rule 1.9. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) (2002); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d
830, 838 (D.C. 1994) (finding the partnership lawyer had developed an attorneyclient relationship with one of the partners).
250 The language in the text resembles a form of advance waiver to a formerclient conflict of interest, which under many circumstances is enforceable. For
a discussion of advance waivers, see generally Michael J. DiLernia, Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large Law Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
97 (2009); Elena Postnikova, Note, Conflict Waivers that Do Not Cure Conflicts
Apparent Inconsistency in the Jurisprudence Governing Advance Waivers and How
These Waivers Can Become More Effective, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (2015).
251 The Model Rules substantially restrict a lawyer’s authority to negotiate an
advance waiver of malpractice. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1)
(clarifying that waiver is only effective if the client has independent representation, and not just the opportunity to seek such counsel). The language in the
text does not ask for a prospective limitation on malpractice liability, but only
clarifies the lawyer’s role during an otherwise ambiguous period of time.
252 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of
Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965, 974–77 (1997) (analyzing the
costs and benefits to attorneys and clients based on a decision to contractually
allow or prohibit conflict of interest representation).
253 The growing availability of incubators and accelerators within the technology startup world, along with the increasing availability of free legal services to the participants in those programs, increases the likelihood that law
firms will encounter the partnership by default and drift phenomena. See generally Ian Hathaway, Accelerating Growth: Startup Accelerator Programs in
the United States, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu
/research/papers/2016/02/17-startup-accelerator-programs-hathaway [https://
perma.cc/4GS8-X8AR] (noting accelerator pool increased from sixteen programs
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common occurrence, firms must have an intentional appreciation
for the role of the firm when the partners come and go.
The foregoing considerations seem to suggest a conclusion that,
from an ethical standpoint, the law firm may proceed in a fashion
that is less complicated and more fluid than when the founders
appear without partnership status. But before we accept that conclusion, we must explore one further consideration that, at a minimum, muddies the analytical waters and, at worst, undercuts the
entity advantages just described. That consideration is the nature
of the partners’ fiduciary duties to one another in the operation of
the partnership business.
3. The Fiduciary Responsibilities of the Partners and the Law
Firm to the Other Partners
Partners owe one another some fiduciary duties.254 The literature about partnership fiduciary duties is vast, with contractarians defending the right of partners to choose autonomously as few
duties as possible,255 and fiduciarians asserting that less sophisticated founders need strong protections established by law.256
Different jurisdictions articulate differing strengths of the required
in 2008 to 170 programs in 2014); Greg Bullock, Want to Raise Growth-Stage
Capital? Join an Incubator or Accelerator, Studies Suggest, CENT. FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL INNOVATION (Mar. 17, 2016, 2:26 PM), http://blog.ceigateway.com
/blog/want-to-raise-growth-stage-capital-join-an-incubator-or-accelerator-studies
-suggest [https://perma.cc/DL9A-T3G9].
254 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 145–46; see also Keatinge, supra
note 6, at 403–08; Donald J. Weidner, Cadwalader, RUPA and Fiduciary Duty,
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 878–82 (1997).
255 For a sampling of this literature, see, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary
Duty, Contract, and Waiver in Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies,
1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 55, 57 (1997); J. William Callison, Blind Men
and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act,
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 109, 112 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 209, 251 (2005) (arguing that the mere status of partners does not
subject them to fiduciary duties).
256 See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 523–24 (1993); Donald
J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership
Act, 46 BUS. LAW. 427, 435 (1991).
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duties within common law partnerships.257 For present purposes,
however, considering partnerships by default with no written
agreements, it is clear that the founders owe each other at minimum a duty of loyalty258 and a duty of care.259 The duty of loyalty
states that a partner may not engage in partnership business for
personal gain,260 compete with the partnership without the other
partners’ consent,261 or support others who would compete with
the partnership’s business.262 A partner must also account to the
remaining partners for benefits received through the partnership
business.263 The duty of care simply requires that a partner make
business decisions for the partnership with the care an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances.264 A lawyer representing the partnership who is aware that a partner is
engaged in a breach of a fiduciary duty and actively assists in that
breach could possibly be liable in tort to the wronged partner(s),
notwithstanding the absence of an attorney-client relationship
between the lawyer and the individual partners.265
Therefore, while representing the founders’ partnership by default during the period when partners might come and go, the
lawyer must be attentive to the treatment of the less influential
partners by the more powerful.266 Unlike with close corporations,
HYNES & LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 240, at 244 (explaining that duties
owed among partners, while fiduciary in nature, are less strict than those of
trustees or guardians, who act as true fiduciaries). Compare Cardullo v. Landau,
105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952) (discussing “utmost good faith and loyalty”),
with Selmark Assocs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 5 N.E.3d 923, 933–34 (Mass. 2014) (applying the same standards to close corporations); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975).
258 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 135–44.
259 Id. at 145–46.
260 RUPA § 404(b)(1) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
261 Id. § 404(b)(3).
262 Id. § 404(b)(2).
263 Id. § 404(b)(1).
264 See id. § 404(c).
265 Fischer, supra note 5, at 965 n.20; see also Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s
Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting
a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 140 (2008); Rutledge,
supra note 5, at 372; Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting:
Should Lawyers Be “Privileged” to Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE
L. REV. 75, 81 (2008).
266 See Molitor, supra note 84, at 567.
257
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majority-interest partners typically cannot squeeze out267 or freeze
out268 partners with minority shares in the business, because the
power of the minority owners to dissolve the partnership provides
an exit opportunity not available to close corporation shareholders.269 But partnerships can and do exhibit behaviors where some
partners treat others wrongfully or oppressively.270 Law firms
that assist unfaithful partners risk liability to the injured partners.271 While the ABA’s Committee on Professional Ethics (the
“Committee”) concludes that a law firm representing a partnership
In a typical squeeze-out transaction, controlling shareholders and/or
managers extract benefits from the corporation and minimize the gains of minority shareholders while they remain members of the business organization.
See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS: PROTECTING MINORITY RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER
INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 1.01 (2d ed. 2003); Marco Ventoruzzo, Freeze-Outs:
Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 841, 842
(2010); Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C.,
541 N.E.2d 997, 998 (Mass. 1989) (finding that the law firm “helped Gross in
his attempts to ‘squeeze out’ the plaintiff from Paragon”).
268 While the terms are often used interchangeably, a freeze out differs from
a squeeze out in that, in the former setting, “majority shareholders force minority shareholders to sell their shares either through a statutory provision or
simply by creating de facto—and sometimes abusive—incentives to sell the
shares.” Ventoruzzo, supra note 267, at 842; see also Brent J. Horton, The GoingPrivate Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in Delaware Non-Corporate
Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 83–89 (2013); Arford v. Blalock,
405 S.E.2d 698, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (“A partner may not … ‘freeze out’ a copartner and appropriate the business to his own use.”).
269 Paul T. Geske, Note, Oppress Me No More: Amending the Illinois LLC Act
to Provide Additional Remedies for Oppressed Minority Members, 90 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 185, 200 (2015); but see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing Partnership
Freeze-Outs, 40 MERCER L. REV. 535, 541–42 (1989) (claiming that partnerships
do experience freeze-out scenarios).
270 See Gevurtz, supra note 269, at 541–42; see also Susan J. Swinson, Partner v. Partner, Actions at Law for Wrongdoing in a Partnership, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 905, 917–19 (1993).
271 See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 26:38 (2016 ed.); see also
Cacciola v. Nellhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (examining a
claim stated against lawyer for aiding in a partner’s breach of fiduciary duty);
Kenny v. Murphy, No. 08-P-996, 2010 WL 46376, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(demonstrating claim against attorney for aiding in a joint venturer’s breach of his
fiduciary duty); cf. Christine L. Eid, Comment, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and
Abetting Squeeze-Outs, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1195–96 (2008) (discussing a similar theory of liability in the LLC context); Larry E. Ribstein, The
Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 146–61.
267
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does not owe any representational duties to the individual partners272—a conclusion with which not all authorities concur273—the
Committee acknowledges that a lawyer may be liable in some settings for assisting one or more partners in a breach of their fiduciary
duties to the other partners.274
Partners with fiduciary duties to one another may manage the
partnership through majority decision-making without any breach of
duty, as long as the duties of loyalty and care are not contravened.275
That result follows from a straightforward reading of RUPA.276
Therefore, Sofia in our example above may act for her entity client
when she has the consent of a majority of the three founders.
The more complicated question for Sofia is how the fiduciary
obligations affect her relationship with the departing partner, after drift or after conflict. The conclusion drawn above was that,
because the departing partner was not a client, the firm could
continue its representation of the remaining partners in a new
partnership replacing the entity, which was dissolved automatically by the departure of one of its members.277 Given the context
272 ABA

Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991).
observe that in some contexts, despite the entity conception of a partnership under both RUPA and the ABA ethics opinion, courts find
that a lawyer representing a partnership owes attorney-client duties to each
partner. See Fischer, supra note 5, at 964; Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a Current
Client, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1157, 1191 (1996); Simon, supra note 5, at 110;
Frederic L. Smith, Jr., Comment, Partnership Representation: Finding the Client,
20 J. LEGAL PROF. 355 (1996).
274 In small partnerships, the ABA opinion observes, “the likelihood that the
attorney representing the entity will be held to stand in a confidential, or fiduciary, relationship with the individual shareholders, or partners, is much greater.”
ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 361 (1991) (citing
Fassihi v. Sommers, 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
275 RUPA § 401(j) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
276 Given that RUPA authorizes partnerships to proceed through majority
voting of the partners and given that a partnership of more than two partners
could not function if all management decisions required full consensus, it is a
well-accepted conclusion that outvoting one’s fellow partners does not amount
to a breach of a duty to those partners. See id. No common law authority exists
to the contrary. Cf. J & J Celcom v. AT&T Wireless Servs. Inc., 169 P.3d 823
(Wash. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the majority partner was not liable to minority
partners for purchase of another partner’s assets, as the majority partner acted
in good faith, paid fair consideration, and disclosed material information).
277 See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
273 Commentators
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examined here, when the business is operating as a partnership
by default at the initial startup phase, with little if any investment and little value to the company yet, the chances that one of
the partners leaves bgecause she has been frozen or squeezed out
is unlikely.278 Obviously, if Sofia learns that Janelle and Arjun
have been actively scheming to isolate and nudge Netia out of the
ongoing operations, the firm ought to ensure that it does not assist
the two in harming the interests of the third.279 But that is not really
the likely worry for the firm in the early stage startup context.
The more common worry for the firm comes after Netia leaves,
for either of the two reasons considered above. Because the law
firm had no attorney-client relationship with Netia individually,
she is not to be treated as a former client, but is instead a former
constituent, and the movement of constituents from an organization does not affect the ongoing attorney-client relationship or the
law firm’s commitments to its entity client.280 The firm has no obligation to maintain confidentiality with regard to any information it
learned from Netia, except as the business requires through its
duly authorized constituents.281 But because the partners owed a
fiduciary relationship to Netia as a partner, the question for the firm
is whether the remaining partners owe any continuing duties to
278 See, e.g., Shareholder Squeeze Outs and Partnership Freeze Outs,
HOROWITZ L. OFFS., http://www.hwchicagolaw.com/practice-areas/corporatelaw
/shareholder-squeeze-outs-and-partnership-freeze-outs/ [https://perma.cc /9VEW
-XYVQ].
279 See Eid, supra note 271, at 1188. Not all authorities agree that assisting,
especially through the provision of conventional legal services, with activity
known to breach a partner’s fiduciary duty will lead to the law firm’s liability.
Some courts have been protective of the attorney-client relationship and discourage claims by non-clients, as the resulting duties create conflicts for the
attorney. See id. at 1222; see also Pierce, supra note 36, at 354. A lawyer may
assist in breach of fiduciary duty unless the client’s conduct equates to crime
or fraud. See Pierce, supra note 36, at 354.
280 See Bryan Corp. v. Abrano, 52 N.E.3d 95, 102, 104 (Mass. 2016) (finding
that a corporation’s lawyer owed a duty to the corporation even after new board
took control).
281 Information counsel learns by representing an organization is protected
by Rule 1.6’s confidentiality duties, but only so far as the organization chooses.
The law firm owes no confidentiality duties to the constituent other than those
chosen by the client, acting through its duly authorized constituents. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 (2000); N.J. Eth.
Op. 664 (1992); R.I. Ethics Op. 04 (2003).
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her, duties that the law firm must seek to respect or, at minimum,
to avoid assisting in their breach.
The law firm’s responsibilities will depend on its assessment
of who owns the property with value within the partnership’s enterprise, including the intellectual property (IP), and how the partners address the property when the drifting partner leaves. Netia
(whether she is aware of it or not) is entitled to an accounting and
a return on her investment as the partnership dissolves.282 Her
“investment” could include her contribution of some of the partnership’s beginning IP ideas.283 The IP would most likely belong
to the partnership, and would need to be transferred to some other
party upon dissolution, perhaps to the remaining partners with
their new partnership, with compensation paid to Netia.284 The
fiduciary duties possessed by Janelle and Arjun toward Netia presumably include the commitment to honor Netia’s redemption rights.
Any efforts by the continuing partners (within the newly established partnership) to deprive Netia of her entitlements would raise
questions for Sofia about the propriety of her remaining as counsel
for the new enterprise after Netia drifted away.285
282 See

RUPA § 701 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
et al., supra note 3, at 775 (“A business begins with an idea.”).
284 HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.12(a); Moore v. Rawson, 85 N.E. 586, 586,
589–90 (Mass. 1908) (holding three continuing partners who used company
name after dissolution accountable to fourth partner for good will of the firm
in the same manner as if it had been sold in dissolution proceedings). The IP
ownership question within a partnership is far too complex to address with any
satisfactory detail here. If the company name or logo has been registered with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, it will be the property of the
partnership. See Pamela S. Chestek, Who Owns the Open Source Project Name?,
103 TRADEMARK REP. 1240, 1252 (2013). With partnerships by default addressed
in this Article, such a registration in the name of the partnership is unlikely.
A successful registration of a patent in the company name is even more unlikely. The partnership more often will possess copyright interests, which arise
more easily in the absence of registration. See Ale & McKinney, supra note 8,
at 478–79.
285 As noted above, if Netia were to agree, while drifting away from the enterprise, that Janelle and Arjun may continue with the business, then the partnership will not dissolve and Sofia will not have a new client entity. See RUPA
§ 802(b); see also HURT ET AL., supra note 30, § 14.11(c); Lange v. Bartlett, 360
N.W.2d 702, 704 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). Her agreement does not eliminate the
partnership’s duty to provide to Netia her buy-out entitlements. See Hillman
& Weidner, supra note 8, at 471.
283 Mann
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It is a good thing for Sofia to worry about how the remaining
partners intend to deal with Netia’s entitlements, but disagreement about that topic does not necessarily mean that Sofia may
not serve as counsel to the new partnership of Janelle, Arjun, and
Rica.286 As long as she does not actively assist the new partnership
or the partners in an effort to deprive Netia of her post-dissolution
entitlements, Sofia could provide legal services to the partnership
on all of its other partnership business 287 (which likely would include the establishment of a formal entity which will later become
the client of Sofia and her law firm).288
In the “drift” scenario involving the startup’s partnership by
default, the question of Netia’s entitlements after the winding-up
of the original partnership is probably not going to arise, as the
new partnership, with Rica replacing Netia, will likely simply proceed in a rather seamless fashion.289 When Netia leaves because
of a disagreement about strategy or similar conflict, the question
of her entitlements is more likely to arise.290 The posture for Sofia
and her law firm remains the same as in the drift scenario. As counsel to the dissolving partnership, Sofia must advise the partners
about the dissolution process and the liquidation or transfer of the
partnership assets.291 If Netia actively competes with the business that would not share or adopt her strategic visions, as may
be likely, that reality is not a significant worry for Sofia’s continuing as counsel for the new partnership, at least under RUPA and
the fiduciary duties it generates.292 Former partners may compete
with one another after the dissociation from the partnership as
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 34–35 (2002).
only reason for not remaining as counsel to the successor partnership (aside from her or the new partners’ preferences) would be to avoid assisting in a breach of the duties owed to Netia. Because Netia was never Sofia’s client,
the ordinary successive conflicts rules involving former clients do not apply.
See Responsible Citizens v. Super. Ct. of Fresno, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 766 (1993).
288 See Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 187–88; see also Pierce, supra note 36, at
332–33.
289 But Sofia ought to be crystal clear that she now has a new client, with a
new engagement letter prepared to establish the new relationship. See supra
note 19 and accompanying text.
290 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 MO.
L. REV. 517, 562 (1984).
291 See RUPA § 801 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
292 See id. § 404 cmt. 2.
286

287 Sofia’s
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long as no partner is relying on the partnership’s trade secrets or
similar confidential information in the successor business.293
Here, then, is Sofia’s role after Netia has left, whether as a
result of drift or disagreement. The remaining partners who will
continue with the business plan will presumably not wish to lose
the company’s counsel because of Netia’s departure, and Sofia
most likely would prefer to continue representation. With Netia’s
express agreement, the partnership may survive, with Sofia’s assistance no doubt, after the partners address Netia’s buy-out rights
as a dissociated partner.294 If the partners happen to renege on
satisfying Netia’s entitlements even after she agrees to a continuation of the partnership, Sofia need not withdraw as counsel for
the continuing partnership so long as she does not assist the partners in what she now sees as a breach of the remaining partners’
fiduciary duties to Netia.295 If she cannot continue to work with
Janelle and Arjun (and now Rica) without assisting in that breach,
then she most likely must withdraw.296
If Netia does not agree to a continuation of the partnership,
the partnership dissolves, and Janelle and Arjun (with Rica now)
will form a new partnership to continue the business enterprise.297
Sofia may accept representation of the new partnership without
encountering any conflict of interest with Netia, even if Netia
293 Id.

(allowing for competition “immediately upon an event of dissolution”).
See Lange v. Bartlett, 360 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
295 See Pierce, supra note 36, at 354.
296 It is not entirely clear that Sofia must withdraw, but prudence dictates
that she should, and will, withdraw. Model Rule 1.16(a) requires that an attorney withdraw from representation of a client if continuing the representation
“will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a) (2002). Rule 1.2(d) declares that Sofia may
not “assist a client … in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”
Id. r. 1.2(d). It is not a crime or a fraud to aid in a breach of fiduciary duty, and
some commentators have concluded, therefore, that the Model Rules do not
prohibit a lawyer from that activity. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 5, at 986–87.
But, as discussed earlier, Sofia may be liable in tort for assisting in the partners’
breach of their fiduciary duties to Netia. See supra note 265 and accompanying
text. Sofia thus has “other good cause” to justify permissive withdrawal under
Rule 1.16, even if the mandatory withdrawal rule does not apply, and she will
rely on that permission to end her representation in order to protect against
tort liability. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (b)(7).
297 See RUPA § 603 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
294
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starts her own competing business.298 But, just as above, Sofia
may not assist Janelle and Arjun in any breach of their duties as
members of a dissolving partnership to treat Netia fairly during
the dissolution and winding-up process.299 The fact of such a
breach does not preclude Sofia’s work with the new partnership
so long as she does not assist in or facilitate the breach.300
IV. REPRESENTING FOUNDERS OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES
This Part addresses the ethical issues arising when a law firm
agrees to represent the founders of an organization intended to
serve as a charitable, tax-exempt organization but before the creation of an entity.301 The “tax-exempt” nature may not necessarily
matter for this purpose, but the “charitable” nature is of substantial concern. Because no individual may own any interest in a
charitable—called here for convenience a “nonprofit”—organization,302 the collection of founders will never morph into a partnership entity, regardless of how active the enterprise has been.303
Precisely because the organization has no owners, its mission and
decision-making protocols cannot be driven by the preferences of
those who own the largest interest in the enterprise.304 Some
other device or protocol must be identified through which the law
firm will take direction from the group’s constituents.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmts. 34–35.
See RUPA § 603 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’NS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1997).
300 Id.
301 Some, but not all, of the ethical issues arising in this setting have been
explored in a prior article. See generally Tremblay, supra note 15 (exploring in
some detail how a lawyer might understand when a loosely structured community group may qualify as an “entity” for purposes of having one client rather
than an aggregate of clients).
302 Every state authorizes the establishment of charitable organizations, typically corporations, which are not owned by any person or persons. See ALVAREZ
& TREMBLAY, supra note 101; LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., AMERICA’S NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A PRIMER 21–25 (3d ed. 2012).
303 See RUPA § 202(a)–(c), cmts. 1–3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST.
L. 1997) (stating individuals must share profits in order for their dealings to
amount to a partnership).
304 See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2008) (noting each member of
the nonprofit’s board has a fiduciary duty to act “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation” as opposed
to the interests of the members).
298
299
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Many of the same issues discussed above will be relevant to a
lawyer’s work with nonprofits, but the following questions apply
especially to the lawyer’s work with founders of a nonprofit enterprise: (1) How ought the lawyer proceed in those settings where the
founders do not know whether their proposed enterprise ought to
proceed as a nonprofit or as a for-profit business?; (2) For those
enterprises whose founders intend to operate as nonprofits, who
serves as the lawyer’s client (or clients)?; (3) Does the charitable
nature of a nonprofit’s mission alter the lawyer’s counseling responsibilities and, if so, how? This Part addresses each of these
questions in order.
A. Discerning the Charitable Nature of the Enterprise
Let us imagine new entrepreneurs for this Part of the Article.
Imagine that Gilad approaches Hank, a lawyer who is a member
of a small law firm, for legal assistance with a project Gilad has
been developing. Gilad has been working with Lynnel and Toni
on a program to provide conflict-resolution skills and protocols for
use in middle and high schools in urban neighborhoods where bullying and violence have been prevalent. The program includes
technology-based systems, training and classroom education, and
direct mediation services. Gilad has a number of questions about
licensing requirements, intellectual property, and choice of entity.
The latter topic includes questions about whether the new enterprise
might be established as a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization, and
the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. The tentative
name of the project is Resolution & Restoration (R&R).
It is apparent to Hank that the R&R project could easily proceed as a for-profit business if the founders so wished. But, it is
equally apparent that R&R, if designed correctly, could qualify as
a Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization.305 Hank also sees a
For the sake of the discussion in the text, assume that Hank is correct.
The IRS has determined that some mediation services qualify as section
501(c)(3) organizations. See Rev. Rul. 80-279, 19802-2 C.B. 176, 177 (stating
low-cost mediation services qualify under section 501(c)(3)). See also Nonprofit
Organizations, MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/organizations [https://
perma.cc/3WME-45J7] (listing 27 national, state, and local mediation services
claiming to be nonprofit). R&R also has the quality of being educational and
serving underprivileged communities, which helps its eligibility for tax exemption. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2014) (“The term charitable ... includes:
[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged[.]”).
305
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possibility of operating R&R with two affiliated organizations, one
a for-profit and the other a nonprofit.306 Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni,
therefore, will benefit from Hank’s careful counseling about the
choice they have in the business’s orientation and structure.
Hank’s counseling of the three founders will, of course, precede
the establishment of any entity, and for some significant period of
time perhaps, as decisions about the choice of entity are difficult
and critical. Because of the uncertainty of the nature of the resulting enterprise, Hank will need to proceed as though Gilad, Lynnel,
and Toni will operate as owners of a for-profit business.307 Since
the business is still at the idea stage, the attributes needed for a
partnership by default are missing,308 so Hank will need to represent each of the entrepreneurs (if they remain as a group sharing
one lawyer) individually and jointly. All of the considerations discussed earlier about that joint representation of a for-profit, inchoate venture will apply to Hank’s work with this group.309
B. Representation of an Emerging Charitable Enterprise
1. Determining the Client Identity
Often, the founders of a new social enterprise have a clearer
vision that the project will be a nonprofit organization, if it ends
up as a reality at all.310 Imagine, therefore, that Gilad, Lynnel,
and Toni approach Hank’s law firm for assistance in establishing
a food pantry in a local neighborhood in need of such a service.
Organizations have developed mechanisms to operate a nonprofit, taxexempt business with a for-profit affiliate. For a description of that strategy,
see Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501,
572–74, 632 (1990); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in LowProfit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2011) (discussing Mozilla Foundation’s maintenance of affiliated for-profit and nonprofit
organizations); Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 34 (2011).
307 See supra Part II.A.
308 See supra notes 29–41 and accompanying text.
309 See supra Part II.A and accompanying text.
310 See generally James Austin, Howard Stevenson & Jane Wei-Skillern, Social
and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both?, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 1 (2006).
306
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Imagine further that these founders have been meeting with a
group of concerned activist residents to map out the project. This
group has decided to call itself Neighbors Concerned for Nutrition,
or NCN. The founders seek to retain Hank’s law firm to establish
a charitable organization and apply for Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status with the IRS.311 Hank is prepared to accept the representation, and turns to crafting a letter of engagement or retainer
agreement for the new client.
Or, perhaps, the new clients. In this thin story, who ought to
serve as the law firm’s client? It appears that three choices exist:
(1) The three individuals as joint clients, like the “inchoate” entrepreneurs above; (2) all of the members of the neighborhood group
as aggregate joint clients; or, finally, (3) the group NCN as one client, as an entity. That array presents two levels of questions for
Hank: First, is the choice among them one for the firm to make as
it so desires, or does some substantive law require a specific arrangement under these circumstances? Second, regardless of the
answer to that question, what does the resulting commitment look
like for Hank and his law firm? This subsection addresses the first
question; the following subsection will explore the second.
Hank must determine at the outset whether he will treat NCN
as an entity client or treat the three founders as individual clients.
His investigation of the relevant substantive law will leave him
without a clear answer, but the more prudent read of the ambiguous authority will most often favor individual representation.
If Hank were to treat NCN as his client, it would be as an informal unincorporated association, since NCN has no other status.312
The substantive law’s guidance might differ depending upon
whether Hank’s jurisdiction has adopted the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (UUNAA),313 which provides otherwise informal associations with rights, duties, and protections, or its
successor Revised Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association
311 See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012) (detailing the requirements of federal tax-exempt
status).
312 See REVISED UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(8) (NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2008) [hereinafter RUUNAA]; UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 2(11) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST.
L. 1996) [hereinafter UUNAA].
313 See UUNAA § 3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 1996).
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Act (RUUNAA).314 Most states have adopted neither,315 so let us
first proceed on the assumption that no such statutory guidance
exists for Hank.
The prevailing authority holds that “[e]ach individual member
of an unincorporated association is a client of the association’s
lawyer.”316 With the possible exception of labor unions,317 no authority has stated that the lawyer representing an unincorporated group does not also represent the members of the group.318
However, a 1992 American Bar Association ethics opinion construes Model Rule 1.13, addressing a lawyer’s responsibilities to
314 See

RUUNAA §§ 3–5 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2008). For
examples of state statutes implementing the Model Act or its 1996 predecessor,
see ALA. CODE § 10A-17-1.01 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59B-2 (2006). The introductory comments to RUUNAA imply that it offers a codification of some
common law principles and practices, which supports the conclusion that in
some states without RUUNAA or its predecessor unincorporated associations
have some legal status. See RUUNAA at Prefatory Note.
315 As of this writing, eleven states currently use some version of UUNAA
(Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), five states have adopted RUUNAA in
some form (Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, and the District of Columbia),
and Texas’s version of the UUNAA which had been in force expired as of the end
of 2015. 29 West’s Legal Forms, Specialized Forms § 25:10 (West 2016); 29 West’s
Legal Forms, Specialized Forms Section 25:11 (West 2016). See RUUNAA at Prefatory Note (2008); Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (2008), UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Unincor
porated%20Nonprofit%20Association%20Act%20(2008)%20(Last%20Amended
%202011) [https://perma.cc/29LT-F4HC].
316 Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
294 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1969); see also Kalamazoo v. Mich. Disposal
Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 236 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“Because unincorporated associations had no separate legal existence, courts regularly held that
attorneys for unincorporated associations had a direct attorney-client relationship with each of the members of the association.”); Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339, 341 (D. Mass. 1982).
317 See Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer’s Obligations to Bargaining
Unit Members: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and Substantive Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1098–1100 (1996).
318 See Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (noting the emerging scholarly
authority holding in certain contexts that “an attorney may represent such
[unincorporated] associations without creating an attorney-client relationship
with its individual members,” while concluding that the joint-defense agreement among several criminal defendants did not qualify for that treatment).
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organizational clients, as not requiring a group to possess “a separate jural entity” in order to qualify as an organization,319 and other
commentators support that conclusion.320
There is, however, a palpable challenge for a lawyer such as
Hank working with a nascent charitable organization to proceed as
though the unincorporated association is an entity that will serve
as Hank’s only client. That challenge arises from what we might
term the “boundary” problem. Here is the worry. The entity designation assumes a discrete, finite group of constituents, who may
be identified and advised about the implications of entity representation.321 With a community-based charitable organization like
NCN, the membership of the group is unlikely to be fixed or obvious. For organizational representation to proceed responsibly, the
boundaries of the organization must be definable, if for no other reason than to have reasonable comfort that the lawyer understands
who qualifies as a constituent and who does not, for purposes of
attorney-client privilege322 and Rule 1.6 duties.323
See ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 365 (1992)
(concluding that an unincorporated trade association may be treated as an entity for purposes of conflicts of interest).
320 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 62, § 18.06 (2016 Supp.); Stephen
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective
Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1103, 1115–16, 1118 (1992); Tremblay, supra note 15. An Arizona State
Bar ethics opinion, addressing the lawyer’s choices when forming a for-profit
corporation, permitted the founders to elect to be treated as one entity client.
See Ariz. St. Bar Formal Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002).
321 In accepting the proposition that a group forming a startup for-profit
business may be treated by a lawyer as an entity consistent with Rule 1.13, the
Arizona State Bar Ethics Committee described a group with limited, identifiable membership. See Ariz. St. Bar Formal Ethics Op. 02-06 (2002).
322 A lawyer’s communications with legitimate constituents of an organizational
client will be protected against disclosure in forensic settings by the attorneyclient privilege. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73
(2000). Communications with individuals who are not proper constituents are not
privileged. See, e.g., In re Diasonics Securities Litig., 110 F.R.D. 570, 574 (D. Colo.
1986) (determining that communications between officer of acquired organization
and lawyer for predecessor organization were not privileged).
323 Rule 1.6’s coverage is far broader than that of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney must maintain communications even with persons outside of the organizational circle as confidential. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note
138. But that does not mean that the boundary problem is not relevant for
Hank and his Rule 1.6 obligations. If Hank discloses information related to the
319
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If Hank is satisfied that NCN has an identifiable, finite membership and a decision-making structure on which he may rely to
discern appropriate lines of authority, he may choose to treat NCN
as his client, and not the individual founders/leaders. But at this
stage of his work with the loosely structured group and its founders,
he is not required to treat the entity as his client. He may choose
to identify Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni as individual clients subject to
the joint client conflicts caveats identified earlier in the for-profit
context.324 Prudence may suggest that he do so to eliminate the
worries of working with an ill-structured community group.325
If Hank happens to practice in a jurisdiction that has adopted
RUUNAA,326 his assessment of his choices must account for that
substantive law overlay. RUUNAA eliminates some of the ambiguity about the entity status of NCN as an unincorporated association, establishing that under appropriate, defined circumstances
such a group may be treated as an organization with an identity
and rights separate from its members or managers.327 If nothing
else, RUUNAA would permit Hank to make a more grounded and
reliable determination of whether NCN is a lawful entity entitled
to proceed in this representational space as a single client,328 and,
if so, how he accepts directions from the unincorporated association’s constituents.329
representation to a person who is not a member of the client organization without consent of a duly authorized constituent, he has breached his duties under
Rule 1.6. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 89 (6th ed. 2007).
324 See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text.
325 See Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community Economic Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45, 48–49, 70 (2002).
326 The discussion in the text would not change if instead of RUUNAA
Hank’s jurisdiction has adopted its predecessor, UUNAA.
327 RUUNAA § 5(a) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2008); see also
Elizabeth S. Miller, Doctoring the Law of Nonprofit Associations with a Band-Aid
or a Body Cast: A Look at the 1996 and 2008 Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit
Association Acts, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 852, 866 (2012).
328 For instance, under section 2(8) of RUUNAA, NCN would constitute an unincorporated association covered by the act if it “consist[ed] of [two] or more members joined by mutual consent pursuant to an agreement that is oral, in a record,
or implied from conduct, for one or more common, nonprofit purposes ....”
RUUNAA § 2(8) (2008). If it qualifies as an unincorporated association, then it
is an entity distinct from its members with perpetual existence unless some
factor serves to determine otherwise. Id. § 5(a)–(b).
329 The unincorporated association would be managed by its managers. A
“manager” is “a person that is responsible, alone or in concert with others, for the
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2. Representational Responsibilities with a Charitable
Enterprise Client
One complexity remains for a lawyer working with founders of
a charitable enterprise. That complexity relates to the deference
a lawyer must offer to the strategic visions of the founders. The worry
to be unpacked here is whether the charitable nature of the client’s
mission, when compared to the typical economic success goals of
a for-profit business, alters in any way the responsibilities of the
nonprofit’s counsel. I will argue that it does, albeit in subtle ways.
A lawyer representing the founders of a for-profit business may
encounter challenges generated by the founders’ potentially varying
personal interests. However, on questions about the underlying
business model and the vision or goals of the business, the lawyer
usually may comfortably follow the guidance of his clients.330 The
for-profit organizational lawyer may be a rich source of business
advice, of course,331 and most commentators agree that the lawyer
possesses a commitment to advise companies about the moral implications of their business strategies.332 Generally speaking, the
management of an unincorporated nonprofit association,” id. § 2(3), and a
“member” is “a person that, under the governing principles [of the entity], may
participate in the selection of persons authorized to manage the affairs of the
unincorporated nonprofit association or in the development of the policies and
activities of the association,” id. § 2(4). The entity need not expressly provide
such titles for those individuals; their function and activity determine their role.
See Miller, supra note 327, at 877.
330 See Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, Lawyering for Groups: The Case of
American Indian Tribal Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3085, 3141 (2013) (“[P]ractically speaking, stating that a corporate lawyer represents the corporation
means that the corporate lawyer’s clear and only role is to help the corporation
pursue profit maximization, and the only remaining question is who is authorized to speak and act for the corporation in pursuit of this one goal.”).
331 See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1057, 1062 (1997) (“This new generation of in-house lawyers ... frequently offers
business as well as legal advice, and its members decidedly reject any notion that
their role is limited to counseling clients on purely legal matters.”); Lynnise E.
Pantin, Deals or No Deals: Integrating Transactional Skills in the First Year
Curriculum, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61, 81 (2014) (“lawyers ... participate in business planning”); Amy L. Weiss, Note, In-House Counsel Beware: Wearing the
Business Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393,
393, 393 n.4 (noting that in-house counsel serve “as business advisors”).
332 The literature on corporate lawyers’ moral responsibilities is extensive and
rich. For a sampling of the discussion, see generally Anthony V. Alfieri, The
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for-profit representation model operates on a client-centered,
autonomy-driven stance,333 in large part because individual entrepreneurs and startup founders are entitled to take whatever
risks they deem appropriate.334
That same deference does not automatically follow when the
lawyer works with a charitable organization. It is particularly delicate when the lawyer works with the founders of such a startup.
To illustrate the concerns, let us first consider the prospect of
Hank’s work with three individual founders of the NCN nonprofit:
Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni. The founders have connections to and support from the neighborhood residents, but Hank has opted to treat
the three founders as his individual, joint clients. The clients’ goal
is to establish an entity that can and will qualify for Section
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. Until NCN, Inc.335 is established,
Hank’s clients will be the three founders as persons. Unlike if
they were founding a for-profit business, Hank must temper his
guidance and counseling of the founders with attention to the
public mission of the proposed venture and the interests of the
larger neighborhood residents.336 Hank is, and must be, counsel
to a larger situation in this setting.337 And he must be transparent
Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L. J. 1909 (2006);
Susan Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 115 (2006); Stephen L. Pepper, Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics
(with Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client), 28 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1069 (2015); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary
Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931 (2002); Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Foreword: Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000).
333 ALVAREZ & TREMBLAY, supra note 101, at 111–12.
334 See Robert R. Statchen, Clinicians, Practitioners, and Scribes: Drafting
Client Work Product in a Small Business Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 233,
270 (2011–2012) (describing the risk-taking nature of entrepreneurs).
335 The odds are enormous that Hank will advise the founders to establish
a corporation to serve as the vehicle through which to operate NCN and to
apply to the IRS for the tax exemption. Most tax-exempt entities are corporations. See David S. Walker, A Consideration of an LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit
Organization, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 633 (2012) (“[T]he ‘predominant’
form of charitable organization in the United States is the nonprofit corporation.”)
(citing JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 48–
53 (4th ed. 2010)).
336 Tremblay, supra note 15, at 390.
337 The commonly referenced “lawyer for the situation” concept, originating
with Louis Brandeis, has been popularized in legal ethics circles by Geoffrey
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with Gilad, Lynnel, and Toni about that gloss on his representational responsibilities.338
In that sense, Hank has what could be described as divided
loyalties. In reality this does not represent a conflict of interest for
him, in the same way that his choice to represent the multiple founders might. The “conflict,” such as it is, is inherent in any lawyer’s
work on behalf of founders of an organization that commits to a
mission that transcends the interests of its founders.339 Hank’s
role is somewhat comparable to that of a lawyer for a fiduciary, in
that the founders necessarily accept responsibilities for interests
beyond their own personal ones.340 The prevailing understanding
is that a lawyer representing a fiduciary treats the fiduciary as his
sole client. He does not represent the ward, but may only proceed
with strategies that do not undermine the interests of the ward.341
Similarly, Hank may robustly represent the three founder clients
and honor their wishes, but only inasmuch as their strategies are
consistent with the mission and governance constraints of a successfully functional nonprofit organization.342
Hazard. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 65 (1978);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377 (2004).
For a description of Brandeis’s connection to the term “counsel for the situation,”
see Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s
Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1502–04, 1502 n.194 (1996).
338 Tremblay, supra note 15, at 390.
339 See Simon, supra note 5, at 59 (noting the difficulty lawyers face in representing organizations consisting of constituents with conflicting interests).
340 See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 300
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
341 The American Bar Association articulates the duty in a more lawyerfriendly fashion, emphasizing that the fiduciary is the client and the ward or
beneficiary a third party like any other third party. ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 380 (1994). Commentators take a more nuanced stance of the special role in which the lawyer finds himself. See generally
Kennedy Lee, Representing the Fiduciary: To Whom Does the Attorney Owe
Duties?, 37 ACTEC L.J. 469 (2011); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving
Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994); Robert
W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation,
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 889 (1994).
342 Especially where the founders of the nonprofit organization aim to
achieve tax-exempt status from the IRS (which is the most likely scenario), the
founders’ choices about organizational structures and visions will be limited by
the IRS’s rules and policies. For instance, the organization must be organized
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Hank must also, notwithstanding his representational duties
to the three joint clients, attend to the worries that commentators
capture with the term “founder’s syndrome.”343 Hank represents
three individuals, but his commitment is to the organization that
the individuals will establish.344 Its founders may, and often do,
desire to include in the corporate governance documents provisions that will assure that the founders maintain control over the
organization.345 Such provisions would be entirely appropriate in
for-profit corporation or LLC papers.346 They might not be appropriate in nonprofit organizational documents,347 even if the IRS
would not object to their inclusion, and even if the three founders
were insistent that the provisions be included. Hank will need to
exercise his discretionary judgment to determine whether the control provisions sufficiently benefit the soon-to-be created organization, rather than the personal preferences of the founders.348 His
and operated in such a way that none of the founders will receive private benefit or inurement except in certain limited circumstances. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2015). The organization must have
in place protections against conflicts of interest. See generally Melanie B.
Leslie, Helping Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law Can Teach Us
About Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 551 (2010).
343 See STEPHEN R. BLOCK, WHY NONPROFITS FAIL: OVERCOMING FOUNDER’S
SYNDROME, FUNDPHOBIA, AND OTHER OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS 135–54 (2004); see
also LESLIE R. CRUTCHFIELD & HEATHER MCLEOD GRANT, FORCES FOR GOOD: THE
SIX PRACTICES OF HIGH-IMPACT NONPROFITS 169, 171 (2008); James J. Fishman,
Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 250, 250 n.235 (2003)
(describing leadership unwilling to defer to the good of the organization).
344 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (2003) (“[A] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through
its duly authorized constituents.”).
345 See Mary E. Costello, The Non-Profit Founder’s Dilemma: Tempering Issues
of Control and Ownership (2007), http://www.creativeedgeconsulting.org/TheNon
-ProfitFoundersDilemma-TemperingIssuesofControlandOwnership.htm [https://
perma.cc/R859-FUXS]; see also Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma,
HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2008, at 104.
346 Most corporate governance documents include mechanisms to address
control by the founders, subject to whatever later negotiations might occur
with future investors or shareholders. See, e.g., GEORGE W. KUNEY & BRIAN K.
KRUMM, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL LAW CLINIC HANDBOOK 51–52 (2013); REED &
BARRON, supra note 18, at 61; Costello, supra note 345.
347 See Costello, supra note 345.
348 See Robin S. Golden, Collaborative as Client: Lawyering for Effective
Change, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 393, 409 (2011–2012) (offering examples of a
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opinion, as a lawyer, on that question is sufficient. He need not be
bound by the instructions of his named clients.349
I do not intend to assume in these observations any hubris on
Hank’s part, or to succumb to the “generalization of expertise” cognitive illusion.350 Instead, the underlying ethical mandate here rests
on the understanding that charitable institutions commit to what
we might deem a “thick theory of the good,”351 while for-profit organizations, especially privately held businesses, can pursue the
idiosyncrasies of their owners, and lawyers have little right to interfere with that pursuit.352 Nonprofit founders may pursue idiosyncratic missions in a more cabined way, and their perception of
the social justice strategies may be debated or challenged.353
CONCLUSION
Most lawyers hired to establish a new startup business will
work with individual founders for some period of time before an
entity emerges, and those lawyers will necessarily make choices
about how to craft an appropriate engagement agreement with
social justice “collaborative” as the lawyer’s client, rather than any particular
members of the group).
349 No reported case or disciplinary report has addressed the argument made in
the text, but its logic follows from Hank’s recognition that Gilad, Lynnel, and
Toni serve as surrogates for the charitable mission, and the unnamed community members who support the mission, which NCN, Inc. will pursue once it is
established. Once an entity has been created, Hank will have more defined
duties to honor the wishes of the duly authorized constituents, even if Hank
disagrees with the values expressed by those instructions. See In re Wise, 740
N.E.2d 946, 955–56 (Mass. 2000) (concluding that attorney for nonprofit organization should be suspended for supporting ousted board members whose
choices he favored, over the objections of current board members).
350 In bioethics circles, the “generalization of expertise” concern represents
the cognitive bias that assumes that an individual expert in medicine will have
expertise in other areas, such as moral questions. See Robert M. Veatch, Generalization of Expertise, 1 HASTINGS CTR. STUDIES 29, 29 (1973); Bethany Spielman
& George Agich, The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining
Qualifications, Reliability, and Helpfulness, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1048–
50 (1999).
351 William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 225 (1991).
352 See William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1447, 1455–56 (1992) (lawyers too often do not respect the idiosyncrasies
of clients).
353 See Tremblay, supra note 15, at 463.
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the founder-clients. This Article has demonstrated that lawyers in
those settings must be especially attentive to the status the founders
are entitled to based on the jurisdiction’s common and statutory
law. Some founders will have rights as individuals; others will be
partners. The differences may matter to the work the lawyer accomplishes. Counsel for a startup must also anticipate that a group of
founders might include participants who may not actually qualify as
founders; therefore, perhaps may not warrant inclusion in the client
collective. Among those founders who do qualify, some may drift
away, replaced by others. This creative and dynamic dance presents ethical opportunities for the team’s lawyer, as she pursues
clarity about her relationship with those individuals. This Article
may serve as at least a preliminary guide for lawyers who find
themselves in this common setting.

